On October 24, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in United States v. Banki overturning the conviction of Mahmoud Reza Banki for violating trade sanctions with Iran and operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business. In this case, authorities alleged that Banki violated the ITR and 18 U.S.C. § 1960, which prohibits the operation of unlicensed money-transmission businesses, for his role in 56 money transfers to Iran through the informal money transmission system known as “hawala” which is widely used throughout the Middle East and South Asia. In the hawala system funds are transferred from one country to another through a network of hawala brokers known as “hawaladars.”

As previously reported, the ITR, which are found at 31 C.F.R. part 560, were promulgated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and are administered by OFAC.  31 C.F.R. § 560.204 prohibits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States persons, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran unless “otherwise authorized” in 31 C.F.R. part 560. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 1705, persons who willfully violate the ITR are subject to criminal penalties.

There are numerous forms of hawala but the two discussed by the Court were the “paradigmatic” system and the “match” system. The “paradigmatic” system works as follows: person 1 located in country A who wants to send money, for example $100, to person 2 in country B would contact a hawaladar located in country A and would pay the country A hawaladar the $100. Next the country A hawaladar would contact a country B hawaladar and ask the country B hawaladar to pay $100 in country Bs currency, minus any fees, to person 2. In the future, when country B hawaladar needs to send money to country A, he will then contact the country A hawaladar, with whom he now has a credit because of the previous transaction, and the country A hawaladar will complete the transaction. Normally, a number of transactions must be completed in order to balance the books between the two hawaladars and periodic settlement of the imbalances occurs via wire transfers or more formal money transmission methods. In this way, people can remit money to others without any actual money crossing the border between country A and country B.

The “match” system works on a similar premise. Under the match system, country As hawaladar seeks out a country B hawaladar looking to transmit money to a third party in country A. Once a “match” occurs, country Bs hawaladar would pay person 2 and then, upon knowledge of payment to person 2, country As hawaladar would pay the third party. Hawaladars derive their profits from the difference in the “buy” and “sell” exchange rates on completed transactions.

The use of the hawala system in the United States to remit funds to and from Iran is problematic for several reasons. First, transferring funds through a hawala qualifies as “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960. Therefore, hawaladars, which typically operate without licenses, are operating illegal money transmitting businesses and are thus in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. As such, U.S. patrons of hawaladars may also be charged for using hawala in the U.S. Second, because money transmission is considered a “service” under the ITR, it is a violation of the Iranian sanctions to transfer money to Iran unless the transfer arises as part of an underlying transaction that is not prohibited.

In Bankis case, authorities alleged that Bankis family members in Iran engaged in 56 money transfers using a match hawaladar to transfer assets to Banki in the United States. Authorities further alleged that for each deposit made into Bankis U.S. bank account, a corresponding payment was sent to Iran for a third party. Additionally, although the funds being transferred into Iran were not Bankis, authorities alleged that Banki knew that for each deposit he received there was a corresponding payout in Iran. Thus, based on this knowledge, authorities alleged that Banki facilitated an American hawaladar in violating the IRT and in operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business.

Authorities charged Mr. Banki with: 1) conspiring to violate the ITR and operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business; 2) violating or aiding and abetting the violation of the IRT; 3) conducting or aiding and abetting the conduct of an unlicensed money-transmitting business; and 4) two counts of making materially false representations in response to an OFAC administrative subpoena. In May of 2010, Banki was found guilty of all counts and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $3.4 million.

On appeal, Banki argued his conviction should be overturned for several reasons. First, Banki argued that executing money transfer to Iran on behalf of others only violates the ITR if undertaken for a fee. Second, he argued that even if hawala transfers are considered a service, non-commerical remittances, including family remittances like the ones in this case, are exempt from the service ban. Third, Banki argued his aiding and abetting of an unlicensed money transmitting business should be overturned because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that participation in a single, isolated transmission of money does not constitute a money transmission business.

In its decision, the Second Circuit provided a detailed analysis of Bankis arguments which will guide future IRT and 18 U.S.C. § 1960 cases. First, the Court found that because the IRT was designed to be a broad and overinclusive sanctions scheme designed to isolate Iran, “the transfer of funds on behalf of another constitutes a Ëœservice even if not performed for a fee.”

Although money transmittal for no fee is still considered a “service” under the ITR, the Court went on to find that 31 C.F.R. § 560.516, which provides that non-commercial remittances, such as family remittances, are exempt from the services ban, is ambiguous as to whether it applies to all instances of non-commercial remittances or only those which take place in depository institutions. In so holding, the Court found that the governments argument that U.S. depository institutions have exclusive authority to process family remittances is inconsistent with the language of the regulation. However, the Court also found that, based on the statutory and regulatory sanctions scheme in place, Bankis argument that anyone, including hawalas, could process a non-commercial remittance is inconsistent with the ITR scheme as a whole. Thus, based on the ambiguity of the breadth of the non-commercial remittance exemption, the Court overturned Bankis convictions for conspiracy and violations of the ITR.

The Court also vacated Bankis conspiracy and aiding and abetting of an unlicensed money transmitting business and remanded for a new trial. In so ruling, the Court agreed with Banki and stated that “to find a defendant liable for operating [or aiding and abetting] an unlicensed money transmitting business, a jury must find that he participated in more than a Ëœsingle, isolated transmission of money.” The Court found that because the evidence presented at trial only showed Bankis knowledge of “match” funds moving to Iran in one transaction, a jury instruction stating that participation in a single, isolated transmission of money does not constitute a money transmission business was appropriate. The trial courts failure to provide the jury with such an instruction was reversible error.

The Second Circuit further held that the lower court also erred in instructing the jury that hawala is both an informal money transfer system and a money transmitting business. The Court found that by so instructing the jury, the district court relieved the government of its burden of proving that Banki had knowledge that more than one transmission had occurred. As explained by the Court, “by later instructing the jury that Ëœa hawala is a money transmission business, the district court arguably was instructing the jury that if it found that Banki operated a hawala, then he necessarily operated a money transmitting business, thereby taking the latter issue away from the jury.” Thus, the Second Circuits opinion distinguishes between the use of a system of money transmission and the operation of a money transmission business.

Although the Court overturned Bankis convictions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, it disagreed with Bankis argument that he was entitled to an “mere customer or beneficiary” instruction. In his appeal, Banki argued that he should not be held liable for conspiracy or adding and abetting because he was “mere customer or beneficiary” and thus exempt from criminal liability. However, the Court found that Banki was charged with aiding and abetting the facilitation of funds to Iran and not with receiving funds from Iran. Thus, because Banki was charged as the facilitator of the transfer he was an intermediary, not a customer, and thus the instruction would be inappropriate. As explained by the Court, “put simply, where the crime charged is transmitting money to Iran without a license, the Ëœcustomer is the wire originator and/or the intended recipient” not the intermediary.

The opinion is noteworthy not only because it is illustrative of the potential criminal charges Iranian sanction violators may face, but also because of the Courts detailed analysis of the Iranian Transactions Regulations (“ITR”) and the federal money transmitting laws. If you have questions pertaining to the OFAC sanctions on trade with Cuba and Iran, the BSA, anti-money laundering compliance, or how to ensure that your business maintains regulatory compliance at both the state and federal levels, please contact us at contact@fidjlaw.com.

On August 2, 2011, the Financial Services Commission of the Florida Office of Financial Regulation issued a report to the Governor and his Cabinet regarding workers compensation fraud in the State of Florida. The report revealed that money services businesses have played an active, critical, and sometimes unknowing part in defrauding the workers compensation insurance market. Money Services Businesses are regulated by the Office of Financial Regulation pursuant to Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. A copy of the Office of Financial Regulations report can be read here.

According to the report, the scheme is designed to allow uninsured subcontractors to procure contracting jobs while avoiding paying workers compensation insurance premiums and payroll taxes on the money earned. (Florida law requires that subcontractors possess a valid workers compensation policy in order to obtain contracts from a general contractor).

The scheme works as follows: First, individuals, known as “facilitators” incorporate “shell” companies, i.e. companies with no business operations, labor force, or physical location other than a P.O. Box, designed to appear as subcontractors on paper. Often times, the facilitators identity is completely unknown as fictitious owners are listed as the owners and officers of the corporation. Next, the shell company obtains a minimal workers compensation insurance policy. Once the shell company has obtained insurance, it proceeds to “rent” its certificate of insurance to uninsured subcontractors. The facilitators allow the uninsured subcontractor to use the shell companys name and workers compensation policy in return for a fee. Uninsured subcontractors who have “rented” the shell company will then have paperwork that appears to be compliant with state law, thus allowing them to enter into construction contracts with General Contractors.

The MSBs involvement in the fraud scheme occurs upon completion of the contract between the subcontractor and the general contractor.  Once the work is completed by the uninsured subcontractor, payment is made to him by the general contractor via check made payable to the “rented” shell company. It is at this stage where an MSB, often a check casher, enters into the scheme because, unlike banks, which normally require that checks made payable to a business or third party be deposited directly into the payees account, a check casher will pay out business-to-business checks, if cashed by persons authorized by the payee. According to the report, “these Ëœauthorized persons are usually the facilitator, and others designated by the facilitator, introduced to and known by the owner/operator of the MSB.”

Upon cashing the check in the name of the shell corporation, two fees are taken out. First, the check casher takes 1.5 to 2% for itself as the fee for cashing the check. Next, a 6-8% fee for the facilitator is taken out as the “rent” paid by the uninsured subcontractor for using the shell companys name and insurance policy. The remaining goes to the uninsured subcontractor as payment for his services. In some cases, the check casher is unaware that its actions are part of a larger fraudulent scheme. Often times in such situations, the check casher becomes an unknowing part of the scheme because of a lack of due diligence in its AML compliance programs.

However, the report also indicated that in some cases the facilitators are actually the MSB owners themselves who act in concert with contractors to find uninsured subcontractors for construction contracts. Additionally, the report noted that in some cases complicit MSBs would falsify Currency Transaction Reports in order to protect the identity of the facilitator by naming the fictitious owners in the CTR. In accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations, an MSB is required to file a CTR for every transaction in currency in excess of $10,000. The failure to file a CTR or the falsifying of a CTR violates both state and federal law. More information on BSA requirements for MSBs can be found on FinCENs website here.

As a result of this scheme, “rent” paid to the shell company is not reported to the shells insurance carrier and is not subject to payroll taxes because the payments appear on paper as legitimate contractor-to-insured-subcontractor payments. Additionally, because uninsured subcontractors save money by avoiding workers compensation insurance premiums, they are able to charge a significantly cheaper rate for their services to their co-conspiring general contractors. These general contractors are then able to lower their bid prices and win construction contract jobs away from legitimate businesses. The report estimates that contractors who participate in the “renting” scheme are able to charge up to 20% less then competition for the same work. The practical effects are far reaching. First, legitimate contractors have difficulty winning bids on construction jobs because they cannot quote prices as low as the conspiring contracting companies. Second, none of the ill-gotten gains are assessed workers compensation insurance premiums or payroll taxes, resulting in a loss of revenue for the state.

Additionally, this scheme makes clear the importance of MSBs having robust AML compliance programs in place so that the MSB does not become an unknowing facilitator of fraud. MSBs must ensure that they maintain detailed and up to date records as required by law. MSBs must also ensure that their employees are properly trained in AML compliance in order to spot suspicious transactions and activities.

If you have questions pertaining to the Office of Financial Regulations, the BSA, anti-money laundering compliance, or how to ensure that your business maintains regulatory compliance at both the state and federal levels please contact us at contact@fidjlaw.com.

On April 15, 2011, federal prosecutors indicted eleven people in connection with their involvement in running PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute Poker, three of the largest internet poker sites in the United States. The Department of Justice has charged these individuals with multiple charges including violations of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud, operating an illegal gambling business, and money laundering conspiracy. A copy of the indictment can be read here.

Additionally, the FBI obtained a court order to block seventy-six bank accounts and five internet domain names associated with the poker websites. As of April 15, 2011, the FBI had shut down two of the sites, Full Tilt Poker and Pokerstars and were working to shut down Absolute Poker. The Department of Justice is also seeking $3 billion in civil money laundering penalties.

Prosecutors allege that, in an effort to get around the prohibitions on unlawful internet gambling under UIGEA, the defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to deceive US banks and financial institutions as to the true identity of the funds being transferred and payments being processed. Authorities allege that the companies used highly compensated third party payment processors to disguise money received from US poker players as payments to non-existent online merchants and phony companies. Authorities alleged that the phony websites, ranging from flower shops to pet supply stores, were all created to handle credit card payments to get funds from US players. A copy of the Department of Justices press release can be read here.

Though the law does not specifically address internet pay for play poker sites, UIGEA defines “unlawful internet gambling” as: 1) placing, receiving or transmitting a bet, 2) by means of the Internet, even in part, 3) but only if that bet is unlawful under any other federal or state law applicable in the place where the bet is initiated, received or otherwise made. However, since UIGEAs passage, debate has raged over whether pay for play poker qualifies under the act with poker sites and federal prosecutors reaching opposite conclusions. Internet poker site operators have argued that UIGEA does not apply because poker should be classified as a game of skill, not a game of chance, and thus beyond the reach of UIGEA.

The indictments may mark a shift in the strategies of federal prosecutors in dealing with internet pay for play poker websites. As we previously reported, prosecutors have previously focused their efforts on payment processors, the financial outfits that move money between online poker sites, their players, and the banks, rather than internet poker sites directly. However, with these new indictments, the Department of Justice has made clear its belief that internet pay for play poker sites do, in fact, violate UIGEA.

If you have questions pertaining to UIGEA, the BSA, anti-money laundering compliance, and how to ensure that your business maintains regulatory compliance at both the state and federal levels, or for information about Fuerst Ittlemans experience litigating white collar criminal cases, please contact us at contact@fidjlaw.com.