UNDOCK THAT APPEAL—THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOESN’T APPLY TO WORKERS ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
By Miguel J. Chamorro
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (the “FAA”), broadly construes arbitration clauses in contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (the term “involving commerce” “signal[s] the broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power”); Allied–Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277–81 (1995) (“evidencing a transaction” means only that a transaction in fact involved interstate commerce, “even if the parties did not contemplate [it]”). However, the FAA exempts certain types of commerce from its reach—even interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed one such case in APM Terminals Mobile, LLC v. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, Local Union, 2025 WL 3202319 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025), when it rejected an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.
The facts of APM Terminals are straightforward. APM conducts stevedoring operations at the Port of Mobile, Alabama, and the employees who move its cargo are supplied and represented by a union. A collective bargaining agreement between APM and the union governed the union’s work for APM. The agreement required all disputes arising therefrom to be settled by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, with the “final step of that process [being] arbitration.” Id. at *1. APM filed suit in court over a union strike and moved for a temporary restraining order. After the union removed the action to district court, APM filed an amended complaint seeking damages, whereupon the union moved to compel arbitration. The district court’s denial of that motion, and the union’s interlocutory appeal therefrom, generated the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
In its appeal, the union made three arguments to invoke the Circuit Court’s appellate jurisdiction and thus avoid dismissal of its appeal. This article explores the first of those arguments: the availability of interlocutory appeals under section 16 of the FAA, which sets forth the type of orders that may be immediately appealed.
The union’s section 16 argument seemed like a winner: the FAA clearly permits interlocutory appeals from, inter alia, orders “denying a petition [for] … arbitration to proceed.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). To invoke that provision, however, the FAA must apply. And it did not. Section 1 of the FAA provides that the FAA does not apply to “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. The precedent on this exclusion doomed the appeal.
As to “contracts of employment,” the Eleventh Circuit has held that “collective bargaining agreements” are ‘contracts of employment’ within the meaning of the [section 1] exclusion.” American Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 1987). Likewise, the Supreme Court held that “workers who physically load and unload cargo on and off airplanes on a frequent basis” are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore fall under the section 1 exclusion. Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 456 (2022)). Indeed, “any class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders falls within § 1’s exemption” and “[a]irplane cargo loaders are such a class.” Saxon, 596 U.S. at 457. See Baltimore & Ohio Sw. R. Co. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540, 544 (1924) (“It is too plain to require discussion that the loading or unloading of an interstate shipment by the employees of a carrier is so closely related to interstate transportation as to be practically a part of it”).
Here’s a short list of other classes of workers “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”:
- Postal service workers, see American Postal, 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1987)
- Transportation workers, see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)
- Field supervisors at package transportation companies, see Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3rd Cir. 2004)
- Independent contractors, see New Prime Inc. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105 (2019)
- Uber drivers, see Singh v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019)
- Delivery drivers, see Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020)
- Airplane cargo loaders, see Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022)
The Eleventh Circuit readily found that the longshoremen at the Port of Mobile were included in the list, holding that there was:
no material distinction between the airline workers in Saxon and the longshoremen here. As the district court explained and the parties do not dispute, the union “represents longshore employees” who help APM “load[] and discharge … containerized cargo” for interstate transportation.
Id. at *2. Thus, the section 1 exclusion applied to the union’s collective bargaining agreement, which meant that the union could not properly take an interlocutory appeal under section 16 of the FAA (or for that matter invoke any provision of the FAA). Id. Its appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The decision serves as another reminder that despite the FAA’s prominent role in the enforcement of arbitration agreements throughout the country, the FAA itself exempts certain cases from its purview.