E-Cigarette Distributor Sues to Stop FDA from Preventing the Importation of Electronic Cigarettes

In an ongoing saga of litigation between electronic cigarette (“E-Cigarette”) distributors and the FDA regarding the power of the FDA to regulate and prevent the importation of E-Cigarettes, another E-Cigarette distributor has thrown its hat into the ring. Last week, Totally Wicked “E.Liquid (“TWI”) filed suit in the United States District Court in Washington DC to prevent the FDA from regulating TWIs electronic cigarettes as a drug, medical device, or combination of the two and from barring their importation. A copy of that lawsuit can be seen here. TWI claims that their product is a tobacco product and should be regulated as such and not as a drug, medical device or combination thereof.

On December 7, 2010, in the case of NJOY v. FDA, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a District Court decision in the e-cigarette industrys favor which enjoined the FDA from regulating e-cigarettes as drugs. That opinion can be seen here. However, it appears that the FDA is nevertheless continuing to regulate of E-Cigarettes despite the DC Circuits ruling, and has issued additional import alerts regarding E-Cigarettes. As such, TWI has now filed suit to protect its own interests and to have the D.C. Circuits opinion applied to its own products.

Fuerst Ittleman lawyers are experienced in bringing suit against regulatory agencies such as the FDA when they seek to regulate products outside their jurisdiction or in ways not in conformity with their own regulations.

Swiss Bankers Indicted in Virginia by Department of Justice Tax Division for aiding tax evasion

On February 23, 2011, a federal indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. section 371, commonly referred to as a “Klein Conspiracy.” The Defendants are Marco Parenti Adami, Emanuel Agustoni, Michelle Bergantino, and Roger Schaerer.

The indictment alleges that an international Swiss bank (unnamed in the indictment) was one of the largest wealth mangers in the world and had branches in the U.S. and over $3 Billion in total assets in undeclared accounts. The indictment also alleges that two private Swiss banks and an Israeli bank participated in the conspiracy. All defendants, either residents or citizens of Switzerland, are alleged to have conspired with each other to defraud the United States for the purposes of impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful government functions of the IRS in the ascertainment, computation, assessment, and collection of revenue “ specifically U.S. income taxes.

The indictment goes on to allege that the conspiracy involved soliciting U.S. customers to open undeclared Swiss bank accounts through the use of nominee tax haven entities, and that as a result of the defendants actions, U.S. customers filed false and fraudulent income tax returns with the IRS and failed to file Form TD 90.22-1 (Foreign Bank Account Report). More specifically, the indictment alleges that the defendants discouraged their U.S. customers from disclosing their unreported foreign bank accounts to the IRS through the Voluntary Disclosure program and instead encouraged their U.S. customers to transfer their funds to other banks in Switzerland and Hong Kong.

The full indictment is available here.

It appears that in the wake of the UBS deferred prosecution and the indictment, trial and conviction of Maurico Cohen Assor and his son, the Department of Justice is stepping up and continuing enforcement of tax related crimes. The attorneys at Fuerst Ittleman have extensive experience in criminal and civil tax litigation and regularly represent those being investigated for criminal tax offenses.Swiss Bankers Indicted in Virginia by Department of Justice Tax Division for aiding tax evasion

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal Expands Definition of “Salaries or Wages” to Include Commissions

On January 26, 2011, Floridas Fourth DCA entered its opinion in Baker v. Storfer, and ruled that the definition of “salary or wages” as used in Florida Statute section 77.035 includes “commissions.” The matter was a case of first impression in the State of Florida. A copy of the Courts decision may be read here.

Baker v. Storfer involved a lawsuit filed by a creditor against a debtor stemming from an unpaid personal judgment. When the creditor sought to collect the judgment by garnishing the debtors wages via a motion for a continuing writ of garnishment, the debtors employer objected and argued that the debtors wages were not “salary or wages” under section 77.035 and therefore not subject to garnishment. The trial court agreed with the debtors employer and ruled that the debtor did not have income that was subject to garnishment.

The Fourth DCA reversed the trial courts ruling by employing a “plain meaning” interpretation of the term “wages.” According to the Fourth DCA, relying on parallel decisions and the Blacks Law Dictionary, the term “wage” is very broad, and includes “”[p]ayment for labor or services, usu. based on time worked or quantity produced; specif., compensation of an employee based on time worked or output of production. Wages include every form of remuneration . . .including . . . commissions.”

Fuerst Ittlemans attorneys are experienced litigators and regularly represent clients in complex cases in State and Federal courts.

FDA Releases Criteria For Criminal Prosecution Under Park Doctrine

The FDA has released “criteria” it developed for consideration of which cases would be appropriate for misdemeanor criminal prosecution under the Park Doctrine, named after a Supreme Court case called United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).

Under the Park Doctrine, an executive may be criminally prosecuted for violations of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, if he or she had, by reason of his or her position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or to promptly correct the violation of the law. This is known as the “responsible corporate officer doctrine,” which does not require that the corporate officer be aware of wrongdoing within the company. Use of this doctrine is limited to misdemeanor offenses involving regulatory or public safety crimes that do not have an intent requirement.

The new criteria released by the FDA is not binding on the agency, and creates no rights or benefits on the behalf of a putative defendant who is potentially subject to Park responsible corporate officer liability. In addition to the individuals position in the company and whether he or she had the authority to prevent or correct the violation, the FDA will also consider, when determining whether to bring a Park Doctrine indictment:

  1. Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm to the public;
  2. Whether the violation is obvious;
  3. Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal behavior and/or failure to heed warnings;
  4. Whether the violation is widespread;
  5. Whether the violation is serious;
  6. The quality of the legal and factual support for the proposed prosecution; and
  7. Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of agency resources.

The announcement regarding the new criteria may be found here.

The FDA has expressly stated that it will seek to increase the amount of Park Doctrine criminal prosecutions of corporate executives whose companies are involved in Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act violations. This increase in enforcement is part of the FDAs aggressive stance in a variety of investigations, one of which has recently resulted in the prosecution of a companys lawyer for obstruction of justice, as we previously blogged here. Compliance reviews, and if necessary, a strong defense team in the face of such potential jeopardy to ones liberty is advisable, necessary and prudent in todays regulatory environment. In addition, when facing a potential Park Doctrine prosecution, executives should consider obtaining separate counsel from their employers, free of any potential conflicts of interest with the company.

Fuerst Ittleman attorneys have represented clients in a variety of FDA-related criminal investigations and prosecutions. For more information, please contact us at contact@fidjlaw.com.

Swiss Government invokes Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in fraud investigation of Miami businessman

Recently, the Swiss government, pursuant to a seldom used Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, (“MLAT”) have requested that the United States Attorneys’ Office in Miami issue subpoenas in regard to a pending Swiss criminal investigation of a Miami businessman suspected of defrauding lenders in Switzerland of over $220 million. The Swiss government alleges that the Miami businessman and others created false financial statements showing that their company was in far better financial shape than was the reality. A U.S. federal judge last month entered an order empowering a federal prosecutor to issue subpoenas and utilize other entities within the federal government to assist with the Swiss investigation.

The U.S. is party to MLATs with a variety of nations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in criminal investigations that cross international borders. These treaties streamline the process for investigators in one country to obtain orders for the production of relevant evidence in another country. MLATS have been used with great success in recent investigations originating in Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago, among other parties to such treaties.

Lawyers at Fuerst Ittleman are experienced in defending companies and individuals that are subject to criminal investigations involving MLATs and other international considerations. When one is served with subpoenas pursuant to an MLAT, it is imperative to obtain the advice of competent counsel to represent your interests.

Fourth Circuit Dismisses Challenge To Federal Embryonic Stem Cell Research Funding Citing Lack Of Standing Of Challengers

On January 21, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a decision of the District Court of Maryland dismissing a consolidated case challenging the federal funding of research involving embryonic stem cells. In agreeing with the District Court, the Fourth Circuit found that both plaintiffs lacked standing, an essential constitutional requirement to bringing case before the court. A copy of the decision can be read in full at: Mary Scott Doe v. Obama.

Article III of the United States Constitution provides that the judicial power of the federal court system extends to “cases” and “controversies.” However, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have “standing” to assert its claim. To satisfy the constitutional requirement of “standing,” a plaintiff must establish: 1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” which is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” and not merely “hypothetical;” 2) causation, i.e. the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;” and 3) redressability, meaning that “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative” that the injury will be remedied by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).

In Mary Scott Doe, two groups of plaintiffs attempted to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13505 (“EO 13505”) and its implementing National Institute of Health (“NIH”) Guidelines which expanded federal funding of human embryonic stem cell research. NIH Guidelines currently permit funding for research involving stem cells from embryos “donated by individuals who sought reproductive treatment . . . and who gave voluntary written consent for the human embryos to be used for research purposes.” 74 Fed. Reg. 32170, 32174. The plaintiffs alleged that EO 13505 and the NIH Guidelines violated the 13th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as the Administrative Procedure Act and the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which prohibits use of federal funds for “research in which a human embryo . . . is destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death.”

The first named plaintiff, Mary Scott Doe, represented a class of all frozen embryos held throughout the US for either research or adoption purposes. The plaintiffs argued that the class of frozen embryos had standing because EO 13505 and the NIH Guidelines “increase the embryos risk of being reduced to . . . stem cells” thus creating an “injury in fact” necessary to bring a case. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that in order to establish standing “named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that because the “complaint provides no basis to conclude that the named plaintiff . . . [will] suffer any injury at all, much less an injury due to the challenge government policy,” “Doe” has failed to allege a “concrete and particularized harm.” Thus, the Court found that “Doe” could not establish an injury in fact.

Furthermore, the Court found that even if “Doe” could assert an injury, “Doe” could not establish causation on the part of the defendant, the US government. Here, the Court found that funding for research was limited to those embryos which were voluntarily donated for research by biological donors. As such, any injury which could have occurred was the result of the independent actions of a third party, not the named defendant. “Where a third party . . . makes the independent decision that causes an injury, that injury is not fairly traceable to the government . . . .The mere fact that the government permits private donors to chose to donate their embryos for research does not . . . make the decision fairly traceable to [EO] 13505 or the NIH Guidelines.”

The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing for the second group of plaintiffs, parents who have children that were adopted frozen embryos and who are considering adopting embryos again. The Court found that the adoptive parent plaintiffs did not claim that they had already suffered an injury. Rather, the adoptive parent plaintiffs claimed that they faced the treat of a future injury because “EO 13505 will reduce the number of in vitro human embryos available for adoption such that they will be unable to adopt.” However, the Court went on to find that the adoptive parent plaintiffs failed to allege facts to “infer that such injury would be actual or imminent.”

In finding that the adoptive parent plaintiffs lacked standing, the Fourth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court precedent established in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In Lujan, the Supreme Court found that in order for a plaintiff to establish standing through the claiming of a future injury, it must be alleged that future injury is “certainly impending.” Id. at 565 n. 2 (emphasis in original). In this case, the Fourth Circuit found that “the plaintiff parents . . . did not allege that they have already tried and failed to adopt embryos, nor do they allege any concrete plans for future adoption, so the possibility that they will never suffer the alleged injury looms too large.”

Fuerst Ittleman has built a reputation not only in the field of complex litigation but also in the legal aspects of the cutting edge field of stem cell research. If you have any questions pertaining to new NIH guidelines or to contact a complex litigation attorney please contact Fuerst Ittleman PL at contact@fidjlaw.com. For more information on Fuerst Ittlemans experience in the legal aspects of stem cell therapies, age management medicine, food and drug law in general, and FDA regulatory and enforcement actions, please visit our Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law practice page.

Federal Judge Finds that Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions Go Beyond Listed Subjects

A recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa casts doubt on the position that a deposition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 30(b)(6) is limited to the matters described in its notice. While the Rule requires a party to identify the matters for which it intends to examine a deponent, there has historically been confusion regarding whether this requirement places a strict limitation on the scope of the examination itself.

The case, American General Life Insurance Co. v. Billard, involved questions concerning a life insurance policy which required a representative of American General to be deposed on behalf of the company. To this end, the defendants counsel took a deposition of a company representative after giving notice under Rule 30(b)(6). This rule is available where a corporation or other entity is to be deposed and provides in relevant part that: “[i]n its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.”

While the Rule does not state that the subject-matter of depositions is strictly limited to the matters for examination described in the notice or subpoena, this is a position that some, including counsel for American General, took. While the defendants notice named 16 different subjects for the testimony, a disagreement arose during the deposition when the witness was asked to testify to matters not identified in the notice. Believing that testimony was limited to the matters identified in the notice, counsel for American General repeatedly instructed the witness not to answer questions that exceeded the scope of the subjects named in the notice. Subsequently, counsel for American General suspended the deposition and moved for a protective order, asking the court to limit the scope of questioning to the matters identified in the notice. In response, defendants counsel filed a motion for discovery sanctions, arguing that opposing counsel improperly instructed the witness not to respond to matters that were properly within the scope of the discovery request. Ultimately, the judge sided with the defendants counsel and found that Rule 30(b)(6) does not limit the scope of depositions to the matters identified in the notice.

The purpose of identifying the subject-matter of depositions under Rule 30(b)(6) is primarily to allow the corporation or other entity to choose a representative who has knowledge of the subjects to be deposed during the deposition. However, because there has been some controversy regarding whether the Rule limits the scope of the examination to the matters described in the notice, the fact that counsel for American General misapplied the Rule was not what the judge ultimately took issue with. Rather, the judge found it problematic that counsel for American General continued the deposition and repeatedly instructed the witness not to answer. In a situation where there is doubt as to whether matters of examination exceed the proper scope of the deposition, the appropriate action would be to end the examination promptly and seek immediate relief from the court.

Lawyers at Fuerst Ittleman have substantial experience in complex litigation matters, including the taking and defending of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.

Seafood Executives Plead Guilty to Selling Mislabeled Fish

Shortly before a trial that was to begin in Mobile, Alabama, two executives from an Arizona based seafood wholesaler, Consolidated Seafood Enterprises, pled guilty to a scheme to defraud the public by mislabeling imported fish. The plea agreement of one of the defendants may be viewed here.

Consolidated Seafood Enterprises contracted with importers to bring in fish from overseas and then sell them to wholesalers that supplied restaurants and stores. Both executives admitted that they bought and sold approximately 385,000 pounds of frozen catfish, called basa, swai and sutchi, which was falsely labeled to evade customs duties. They then passed 101,000 pounds off as grouper to customers in southern states including Alabama and Florida. They sold 25,000 pounds of Lake Victoria Perch as grouper or snapper. The defendants also admitted to overstating the size of shrimp they sold and falsely labeling them as wild caught from the U.S., when in fact they were from shrimp farms in foreign countries.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, one executive Karen Blyth, will serve 2 years and 9 months in prison, while her co-defendant, David Phelps will serve 2 years in prison. The defendants also agreed to the forfeiture of over 7,000 pounds of fish. The Court will determine the amount of fine and both executives will not be able to hold ownership or managerial interests in the seafood industry until after they serve 3 years of supervised release after completing their prison sentences. The Court accepted the plea agreement on January 24, 2011.

The mislabeling of food products is a violation of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, and the Lacey Act, while submitting false statements to Customs to evade duties is a violation of Title 18 of the Criminal Code. Fuerst Ittleman lawyers have substantial experience representing clients involved in both the distribution and importation of food products who are under federal criminal investigation for violations of these laws.

Discovery Violations Result In Judge Striking Defenses in DuPont’s Benlate Pesticide Litigation

A recent decision in ongoing DuPont Benlate pesticide litigation in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court demonstrates the serious consequences that can arise from a partys deliberate attempt to conceal discoverable information. On January 20, 2011, Miami-Dade Circuit Court Judge Amy Steele Donner ordered DuPonts defenses struck as a sanction for discovery violations described by the Court as an “unconscionable scheme” which constituted a fraud on the court.

The sanctions stem from litigation, which began in 1992, between DuPont and five Miami-Dade County growers for crop damage from the use of Benlate, a pesticide produced by DuPont until 2001. The plaintiffs claimed that discovered documents revealed a near 20 year cover up by DuPont whereby DuPont misfiled and mislabeled documents in an effort to avoid their discovery obligations. The growers alleged that DuPont deposited tens of thousands of pages of documents into a document depository created by DuPont for the litigation but then subsequently removed those documents claiming they were not relevant to the case.

On March 17, 2010, Judge Donner issued an Order demanding DuPont immediately produce all documents it deemed unrelated to the case which it had previously removed from the document depository. In response, DuPont surrendered over 37,000 documents, though the plaintiffs claimed 67,000 more pages should be produced. On May 14, 2010, Judge Donner held a hearing to determine whether DuPonts actions were a violation of discovery rules but did not issue a ruling until January 20, 2011. In the Courts January 20, 2011 ruling, the Court found that DuPont purposefully “manipulated the [document] depository . . . in order to interfere with the plaintiffs ability to conduct discovery.” The Court went on to describe DuPonts actions as a “fraud on the court” designed to “restrict the plaintiffs ability to gather evidence to prove its claims.” As a result of DuPonts actions, Judge Donner struck DuPonts defenses and will conduct a trial on damages only.

In striking DuPonts defenses, Judge Donner relied upon Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380 which governs sanctions for discovery violations. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P 1.380(b)(2)(C), a trial court may enter an order striking out pleadings and defenses and render a default judgment against a disobedient party. However, the striking of pleadings and/or the entering of a default judgment is rare and considered “the most severe of al sanctions which should be employed only in extreme circumstances.” Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 804 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). “A deliberate and contumacious disregard of the courts authority will justify application of this severest of sanctions, as will bad faith, willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court, or conduct which evinces deliberate callousness.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983).

Fuerst Ittleman has built a reputation for getting results in wide variety of complex litigation cases in federal, state, local, and appellate courts. Contact a complex litigation attorney from Fuerst Ittleman at contact@fidjlaw.com.

Joe Diruzzo of Fuerst Ittleman petitions United States Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari

Joe Diruzzo of Fuerst Ittleman petitions United States Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari [PDF]

On January 10, 2010, Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III, Esq., CPA, an associate at Fuerst Ittleman filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court inLizardo v. United States, available [here].  The Petition seeks to review the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, where the Third Circuit held, inter alia, that it lack jurisdiction to hear Lizardo’s appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, available [here]. The Third Circuit expressly noted a split in opinion from the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of National Ecological Foundation v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2007).

The background of the case is as follows.  Lizardo sought to vacate his sentence via collateral attack pursuant to 28 USC sec. 2255.  The District Court of the Virgin Islands denied Lizardo’s sec. 2255 petition.  Lizardo then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), commonly referred to as a motion for reconsideration. At the time of the litigation before the District Court a motion for reconsideration had to be file within 10 days of the final judgment to be timely (currently the time for a motion for reconsideration is 28 days). The Defendant, the  United States, did not object to the motion for reconsideration on timeliness grounds.  The District Court then denied the motion for reconsideration on the merits.

Lizardo then filed a notice of appeal with the Third Circuit.  The United States, at that point, first objected to the notice of appeal as being untimely as defined in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 and claimed that the Third Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear Lizardo’s appeal.  In coming to its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Lizardo’s appeal, the Third Circuit noted that notwithstanding that motion may be "timely" for district court litigation, it is not necessarily "timely" for circuit court litigation.  The reason that Lizardo’s motion for reconsideration was "timely" at the district court level was that motions for reconsideration, and the then 10 day time limitation, were not founded in statute and hence not jurisdiction.  Rather, motions for reconsideration were based on the rules enabling provisions, and objections based on lack of timeliness are subject to forfeiture by the opposing party is not properly raised.  In 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), announced the new "claims-processing" jurisprudence.  Subsequently in 2005 and 2007 the Supreme Court further expounded on the "claims-processing" rules in Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) and Bowel v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).

However, the Third Circuit in its decision ruled, in direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit in National Ecological Foundation, that a party could raise a timeliness objection in the first instance at the Courts of Appeals.  The Third Circuit then described its rationale why it departed from the Sixth Circuit.  The Third Circuit took exception to the Sixth Circuit’s approach claiming that there would be a disparity in treatment in the six types of post-judgment motions addressed in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), and the recent amendments to the Rules of Appellate procedure sought to standardize the time in which post-judgment motions must be made.  Additionally, the Third Circuit noted that the Sixth Circuit’s approach produced uncertainty in the appellate timeline.  Finally the Third Circuit quoted to its prior decision in Guitierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F. 3d 187 (3d Cir. 2008), for the proposition that "the fact that [a] motion was timely for the purposes of the District Court’s schedule does not necessarily made it timely for an appeal to the Court."

Interestingly, Judge Jordan authored both a concurrence and a dissent, concurring that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal of the denial of the 28 USC sec. 2255 petition, but not over the appeal of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.  In Judge Jordan’s dissent, he reaches the same conclusion regarding jurisdiction that the Sixth Circuit reached.

In Lizardo’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed with the U.S.Supreme Court the following highly technical questions were presented for the Court’s consideration:

1.         Whether, in light of this Courts holding in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), and its progeny, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that when a party forfeits an objection to the untimeliness of a motion at the trial level, that forfeiture does not operate as a bar to a subsequent untimeliness objection at the appellate level, operating to cause the notice of appeal to be “untimely” for the purpose of Fed. R. App. 4, which is also contrary to a decision of another circuit.

2.         Whether, in light of this Courts holding in Kontrick, supra, and its progeny, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to adopt the position of the dissenting opinion which concluded that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over Petitioners appeal from the trial courts denial of Petitioners deemed timely motion for reconsideration, which is also contrary to a decision of another circuit.

It remains to be seen if the U.S. Supreme Court will accept jurisdiction, but the Petition ended with the following passage that demonstrates the importance of this issue:

"[T]he determination of a “timely” appeal for Rule 4 purposes is a recurring issue; an issue that potentially affects every appeal before the Circuit Courts, and in turn affecting the number of cases [the U.S. Supreme] could potentially review on the merits.  [The U.S. Supreme Court] should grant the instant Petition to address this extremely important issue of federal procedural law."

The attorneys at Fuerst Ittleman handle complex issues of federal litigation at the District Court, Circuit Court, and if necessary in the U.S. Supreme Court.