Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Challenges Often Turn On Interpretation of the Court’s Commerce Clause Jurisprudence

Sep 20, 2011   

On September 13, 2011, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued its decision finding that the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) exceeded Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause and therefore is unconstitutional. As discussed in a recent Forbes article, this decision is merely one in a long line of District and Circuit opinions on the constitutionality of the PPACA. Ultimately, the individual mandate provision the PPACAs constitutionality will turn on the interpretation of two bedrocks of Commerce Clause precedent, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). A copy of the Forbes article can be read here.

Generally speaking, Congresss power under the Commerce Clause extends to three broad categories. First, Congress may regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Finally, Congress may regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). It is within this third category that Congresss Commerce Clause authority is pressed to its “outer limits” and is often the subject of judicial challenge. See Id. at 557. Such is the case with the PPACA.

In Wickard, the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate the production of home grown wheat meant solely for personal use under its Commerce Clause power. In so holding, the Court found that although Filburns activities were entirely local, such activities, when taken in the aggregate, had a substantial effect on the national market for wheat. In the annals of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Wickard v. Filburn represents the high-water mark for Congressional power.

More than 60 years later,    in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court upheld Congresss authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the possession of home-grown marijuana intended solely for personal use, even when such possession was allowed by state law. Similar to the Courts rationale in Wickard, the Raich Court found that the production of marijuana substantially affects supply and demand in the national market; therefore the regulation was “squarely within Congress commerce power.” The Court went on to hold that “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself Ëœcommercial . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” Raich, at 18. Both Raich and Wickard stand for an expansive and broad reading of Congresss power under the Commerce Clause.

In finding that the PPACAs individual mandate was unconstitutional, Judge Conner distinguished the mandate from the economic regulations at issue in Wickard and Raich. The Court found that unlike the laws at issue in Wickard  and Raich, which allowed people to not engage in regulated conduct and thereby stay beyond the reach of the statute, PPACAs mandate requires people to become active participants in the health insurance market regardless of whether heath services will be used. As explained by Judge Conner:

Congress can reach the personal production of wheat “ a clear activity affecting the interstate market “ in an effort to stabilize the wheat market. Congress cannot, however, in order to stabilize that market, force the purchase of wheat by individuals who decide to forego wheat or wheat products, even if Congress legitimately determines that an individuals decision not to purchase wheat or wheat products inhibits the governments ability to regulate or stabilize the wheat market. Similarly, Congress may lawfully regulate the interstate market for health insurance and health services, but Congress cannot require individuals who choose not to purchase health insurance or individuals who are not currently seeking or receiving services in the health care market to purchase health insurance in order to stabilize the health insurance market. Congress cannot mandate or regulate in anticipation of conduct that may or may not occur.

Bachman v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, et. al., at 36.

The Court went on to find that an uninsured individuals conduct has no effect on conduct Congress sought to regulate under the Commerce Clause until such time that: 1) the individual obtains health care services; and 2) the individual does not pay for the services received. The Court stated that “the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, has absolutely no impact on interstate commerce . . . at least not any more so than the status of being without any particular good or service.” Id. at 38. As a result, “current Commerce Clause precedent does not permit Congress to reach a pre-transaction stage in anticipation of participation in a market. . . .”Id. at 40.

Ultimately, it is likely that the final decision as to the constitutionality of the individual mandate of the PPACA will be made by the Supreme Court. Such a decision has the potential to reshape Congresss power to regulate individuals and businesses under the Commerce Clause regardless of its outcome. Fuerst Ittleman will continue to monitor the litigation challenging the PPACA and its effects on Commerce Clause jurisprudence. For more information, please contact us at contact@fidjlaw.com.