Foreign-Sourced Injectables and the Ever Present Risk of FDA Enforcement

By Andrew S. Ittleman
November 2, 2020

The following article was written by Andrew Ittleman for the November 2020 edition of  MedEsthetics Magazine. We repost the article here with MedEsthetics Magazine’s permission.

My first interaction with MedEsthetics Magazine was in 2013. That year, I lectured at the annual AACS Scientific Meeting in Las Vegas about a recent case involving counterfeit Avastin, an infused cancer drug, and how it impacted the medaesthetics industry. In that case, a group of Canadian online pharmacies had distributed the counterfeit product to hundreds of physicians in the United States, who then administered it to patients and, in many cases, were reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid. Some of those doctors were criminally prosecuted, and all of their names were posted on the FDA’s website, even though none of them knew they had done anything wrong. Of course, as I also discussed in that lecture, it was around that same time that I started receiving calls from doctors who were having their own uncomfortable interactions with the U.S. government as a result of their purchase and use of injectable products from the same group of Canadian pharmacies. Many of those doctors were dermatologists and cosmetic surgeons, and Medesthetics Magazine featured my lecture in its April 2013 issue.

There have been ebbs and flows in the story between then and now, but for the most part it has continued unabated. The cases I have handled for dermatologists and cosmetic surgeons have typically begun when the doctor received an unsolicited fax or email from a company claiming to be a pharmacy and offering discounted prices on injectables, including a variety of fillers and, most often, Botox. Intrigued by the lower price, the doctor purchased the products, they were delivered via next day air, an admin at the office unpacked and stored them with the rest of the clinic’s injectables, and the doctor used them on his patients. Unlike the Avastin case, in every case I have seen, the products have worked just fine, the patients were as satisfied as ever, and the doctor naturally reordered, sometimes again and again without a single adverse incident. Nothing to see here, right?

Unfortunately, no, there’s always more to the story, which is why I have to get involved. There are two main problems: the law, and the ease with which these cases rise to the surface.

First, the law. Remember the unsolicited fax the doctor received? Well, it turns out it came from a pharmacy in Canada. But the product was fine, right? Yes, the product itself was fine, but it was intended for a market other than the United States, such as Canada, the UK, Turkey or Pakistan, and if the doctor himself unpacked it he may have seen that the labeling was different than what he was used to, and may have even been in a foreign language. And had the doctor been an FDA lawyer, he may have understood that when FDA approves a product, it also approves the product’s labeling, so the law treats these foreign versions of approved injectables as unapproved when they enter the country and arrive at the practice. The doctor has violated the law without even knowing it.

Second, the facts. These cases have typically risen to the surface in one of two ways. In some instances, sales reps for the injectable manufacturers have noticed a discrepancy between the volume of products sold to the doctor by the sales rep and the total number of products in the doctor’s inventory. From there, the sales reps have reported the discrepancy to the manufacturer, who then reports it to FDA, who then initiates an investigation, in many cases resulting in prosecution. This trend was reported in a 2016 Reuters Special Report called “Botox Police” which described “low morale” at FDA as a result of the volume of these cases involving no criminal intent on the part of the targeted doctors. In more instances though, these cases have risen to the surface when FDA has cracked down on the Canadian pharmacies distributing the unapproved versions of the products in the United States. Most notably, in 2012 FDA and INTERPOL launched “Operation Pangea V” in which FDA seized customer information from one such group of pharmacies and then posted the names of 250 U.S. doctors on fda.gov. There have been six more Operation Pangeas since then, which reached their crescendo with the U.S. government’s criminal conviction of Kristjan Thorkelson, the Canadian citizen who started the Canada Drugs Online Pharmacy Network. Of course, Mr. Thorkelson was prosecuted in Montana, which was where the unapproved versions of the products were smuggled to be shipped by next day air to the unwitting American purchasers.

These cases, which continue to this day, reveal important phenomena. Primarily, even beyond injectable products, there is still a strong incentive to purchase foreign sourced drugs because they are less expensive. Foreign governments can set price controls for drug products, even Botox, but the United States government cannot, so manufacturers make up the difference here. The Trump Administration has sought to create a legal pathway for the sale of certain foreign sourced drugs in the U.S., but faces regulatory hurdles and bipartisan political opposition. For its part, Allergan has announced that “legalizing prescription drug importation is a highly dangerous way to help people afford their medicines…”

Next, the number of these cases, and the duration of this story, reveals the ease with which they can be prosecuted. In short, when a doctor imports unapproved drug products into the United States, he commits a federal misdemeanor, whether he knows it or not. Under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the “Park Doctrine” – which is named after a 1975 Supreme Court case called United States v. Park – allows the government to seek a misdemeanor conviction against individuals for alleged FDCA violations without proving that the individual was even aware of the violation. Instead, the government need only establish that the violation occurred and that the individual could have prevented or corrected it, a far lower burden for a less serious criminal violation, typically resulting in no prison time.

Even though these misdemeanor cases are less serious than felony cases involving intentional conduct, they can still have grave consequences, especially for doctors. Primarily, doctors are required to report these cases to their medical boards, which can lead to separate sanctions related to their licenses and reputation. Additionally, these misdemeanor cases can lead to collateral cases filed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, resulting in restrictions on the doctors’ ability to receive reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid, and even to work for other companies that do. And finally, these cases tend to settle quickly, because the threat of fraud and money laundering charges looms behind each of them. In short, keeping in mind that the doctors’ patients were likely never told that they would be injected with an unapproved version of a familiar product, it takes little effort for the government to ratchet the unwitting misdemeanor violation up to a felony fraud violation, and to the extent the doctor deposited the proceeds of that fraud into a bank account, money laundering allegations can also follow. For obvious reasons, these cases rarely, if ever, go to trial.

However, the FDCA does recognize a “good faith” defense to the misdemeanor charges, but establishing good faith requires real due diligence on the doctor’s part. For starters, doctors should be aware that all entities that distribute drug products in the United States are required to register with FDA, and in many instances the individual states, so the doctor would be wise to check on those registrations before purchasing from an unfamiliar distributor. Even if the distributor can survive the initial due diligence, the doctor – as opposed to an admin – should inspect the product’s packaging and confirm that it is, in fact, the U.S. version of the familiar product. The packaging itself, the language in which it is written, and dosing recommendations are all critical features. Finally, to the extent there is any lack of familiarity with the seller, the doctor can request a “guaranty,” in which the seller certifies in writing that the product complies with U.S. law. Of course, none of these efforts provides complete protection from enforcement, but they can lower the risk of worst case scenarios.

In sum, doctors are always free to explore new and less expensive injectable options for their practices. However, FDA has pursued these cases against doctors for the past 8 years with no signs of relenting. So long as this trend continues, doctors should keep in mind the ever present risk of enforcement, and conduct thorough due diligence of all new distributors before even considering injecting their products into patients.

Florida’s Zombie Chevron Problem

Florida’s Zombie Chevron Problem: An analysis of DHSMV v. Chakrin, binding precedent, and administrative agency deference in light of Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const.

On October 14, 2020, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal issued its opinion in DHSMV v. Chakrin reinstating the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license. In so doing, the Second District continued to shape and define the role of courts, particularly circuit courts sitting in their appellate capacity, when it comes to administrative agency deference and whether deferential jurisprudence written prior to Art. V, § 21 being added to the Florida Constitution still binds the circuit courts.

In understanding the implications of this decision, a review of Chevron deference and Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. is important.

  1. A. Chevron Primer.

As administrative law practitioners are well aware, the Chevron doctrine describes the manner by which courts “defer” to administrative agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes over which each respective agency has been delegated rulemaking authority by the legislature. The doctrine gets its name from Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that in instances where a law passed by Congress is silent or ambiguous with regard to an issue, the courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law it is in charge of implementing unless that interpretation is unreasonable. In the intervening years, Chevron has become a broad sweeping rule of construction which requires deference to the agency’s interpretation even if  the court finds that other interpretations of the statute are reasonable or believes that the agency’s interpretation is not the most reasonable among competing interpretations. As explained in Chevron,

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issues, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

476 U.S. at 842-843.

  1. B. Art. V, § 21 Fla. Const.

Although the Chevron doctrine is a creature of federal case law, until 2018 the doctrine was applied with equal force by Florida courts when considering state administrative agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous Florida laws. However, in 2018, Florida voters passed an amendment to the Florida Constitution which states:

Art. V., SECTION 21. Judicial interpretation of statutes and rules.—In interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court or an officer hearing an administrative action pursuant to general law may not defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of such statute or rule, and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo.

Art. V, § 21 thus reshaped the deference afforded by courts to administrative agency interpretations of statutes and rules over which they have jurisdiction. However, an unanswered question is whether the plain language of Art V, § 21 displaced existing case law, i.e. jurisprudence written prior to the 2018 amendment to the Florida Constitution. DHSMV v. Chakrin helps shed light on this issue.

  1. C. The Chakrin Decision.

Chakrin involved a petition for the reinstatement of Chakrin’s driver’s license after it was permanently revoked by DHSMV following Chakrin’s DUI manslaughter conviction. Under the relevant law at issue, even if a party’s license is “permanently” revoked, the party may later have his license reinstated if he meets certain factors, including, as relevant here, being “drug-free” for at least five years prior to the hearing. At Chakrin’s hearing, he admitted to consuming one beer during this period. As a result of this admission, the DHSMV denied reinstatement finding that, due to the consumption of alcohol, Chakrin had not been “drug-free” within the past five years.

Chakrin filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit court arguing that the agency erred in denying the reinstatement of his license because the statute does not specifically reference alcohol use; therefore, the agency’s interpretation of “drug-free” as including “alcohol-free” was a departure from the essential requirements of law. The circuit court agreed and quashed the agency’s decision. As part of its findings, the circuit court found that “the court is no longer required to defer to the Department’s interpretation of the word ‘drug’ and [that it] is not bound by case law relying on such interpretations.” (emphasis added). It was this latter finding that the Second District took issue with when the agency sought second-tier certiorari review.

In quashing the circuit court’s decision and reinstating the agency’s decision to deny reinstatement, the Second District found that the circuit court failed to apply the correct law because it ignored binding precedent which had previously interpreted the statute to include alcohol consumption within the meaning of drug use. In so finding, the Second District clarified that the circuit court’s determination that it was not bound by pre-amendment cases was incorrect. In short, according to the Second District, district courts of appeal decisions represent the law of the land in Florida unless and until they are overruled. The Court noted that there were two potential bases for ignoring such precedent: i) if the plain language of the statute conflicts with prior precedent; or ii) if Art. V, § 21 changed the precedential value of prior cases interpreting the statute under the Chevron standard of deference. However, the Court found neither circumstance existed to allow the circuit court, within the limited scope of its review on certiorari, to disregard prior precedent.

With regard to Art. V, § 21, the Second District found that the constitutional amendment’s language does not address the precedential value of past cases which were based on Chevron deference. While the Court recognized that the amendment begged the question of whether such precedent was outdated, the Court was quick to explain that the decision to overturn precedent is the proper function of the courts which actually make precedent, i.e. the District Courts or the Florida Supreme Court, as opposed to circuit courts even when ruling in a limited appellate capacity. Thus, the circuit court was required to apply the precedent of the district court and could not simply ignore it and substitute its own statutory interpretation.

In its opinion, the Second District also opined on a gap in the appellate rules which distinguish reviews of administrative proceedings in the circuit courts from reviews of county court proceedings which can be heard in either circuit courts or the district courts. Under the current rules, a county court can certify a question of great public importance to the district court. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(4)(A); Fla. R. App. P. 9.160. The Court explained that in situations where a question exists on whether prior precedent controls, the County to District Court certification process (wherein the district court decides the appellate issue rather than the circuit court) provides an avenue for the precedent-making court to directly address the issue. However, no such certification process exists under statute or the rules of appellate procedure to allow for a certification of great public importance in instances where a circuit court is hearing an appeal of an administrative decision. Whether this gap in the rules is ultimately rectified by future changes remains to be seen.

The practical effect of the Second District’s opinion is that although Chevron deference may now be unconstitutional in Florida, precedent based upon the Chevron doctrine continues to govern unless and until overruled by the court that issued it in the first instance. Thus, agency deference – for the time being – remains a jurisprudential revenant practitioners must be aware of.

The impacts of Art. V, § 21 on administrative/government agency litigation continue to evolve. The administrative law and appellate attorneys of FIDJ have represented clients in administrative litigation and appeals in state and federal courts across the country. For more information on our administrative law and appellate practice groups, you can email us at contact@fuerstlaw.com or call us at 305.350.5690.

What to Know About Prelaw College Majors

A prelaw major isn’t the only or even necessarily the best option for future lawyers, experts say.

By Ilana Kowarski
June 25, 2020

A COMMON MISCONCEPTION among law school hopefuls is the belief that they must pursue a college major that is law-related, but J.D. admissions experts say nothing could be further from the truth.

A prelaw major is not mandatory for admission to law school, experts emphasize, and it’s not even available at many undergraduate institutions. Because colleges often refrain from offering professional degrees and instead focus on traditional academic disciplines like history and chemistry, schools that offer a prelaw major are the exception to the norm, according to experts.

Prelaw college majors are designed to prepare aspiring lawyers for law school, and these majors often include an eclectic combination of humanities and social science classes ranging from philosophy to political science. An undergraduate prelaw curriculum may also include seminars on specific areas of law like constitutional law, and it could include classes on topics relevant to the practice of law such as rhetoric, public policy, psychology, sociology, accounting or economics.

Although this field of study touches on many subjects that might be intriguing to aspiring attorneys, there are other concentrations that can provide a solid foundation for a legal education, experts say, noting that an undergraduate degree in nearly any field can set the stage for a law degree.

One reason aspiring lawyers have so much flexibility when choosing what they study is that law schools do not expect incoming students to have specific content knowledge, explains attorney Jeffrey Molinaro, a partner with Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, a Miami-based business law firm.

“There is no real set curriculum, and there is no real knowledge base that is tested on the entrance exam for law school,” Molinaro added, referring to the Law School Admission Test, or LSAT. “It’s a skill-based test.”

Current and former law school admissions officials encourage prospective law students to take college courses that they find most compelling, as long as those classes are challenging. They stress that unlike medical schools, which will consider applicants only if they have completed certain prerequisite classes such as organic chemistry, law schools typically do not instruct candidates about the undergraduate courses they should take.

Christine Carr, a law school admissions consultant with Accepted and former associate director of J.D. admissions at Boston University School of Law, observes that college students tend to do well when they focus on subjects they enjoy.

“The choice of major should not be made solely ‘because it will look good on a law school application and show that I am interested’ – that is what the personal statement is for,” she wrote in an email, adding that college students may join their school’s prelaw society regardless of their major.

Anna Ivey, founder of Ivey Consulting and former dean of admissions for the University of Chicago Law School, says law schools don’t “have any special preference” for prelaw majors.

“Admissions officers are mostly agnostic when it comes to choice of major and indeed try to assemble a class with a variety of different backgrounds and areas of expertise,” Ivey wrote in an email. “And in a moment of candor, they would probably also tell you that they don’t consider pre-law majors to be all that analogous to what you do in law school, and that it’s better to wait until you get to law school to study law.”

Some law school faculty members discourage aspiring lawyers from pursuing prelaw majors.

“A prelaw major doesn’t provide particular subject matter skills, and may therefore be a wasted opportunity,” Nora V. Demleitner, the Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr. Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of Law in Virginia, wrote in an email. “After all, in today’s law practice lawyers often benefit from subject matter knowledge, such as acquired in data science, health, art, forensics, depending on the practice area. Why limit your exposure and interest to law only?”

David Jacoby, an adjunct professor of law at Fordham University School of Law in New York City and a partner at the Culhane Meadows corporate law firm, notes that college may be a future lawyer’s last opportunity to study a subject besides law.

There is also a risk that someone who begins college as a prelaw major might discover later that he or she doesn’t want to become a lawyer, Jacoby adds. He warns against exclusively taking law-related classes. “You’re sort of narrowing your options to a considerable extent at that point.”

Victoria Turner Turco, founder and president of Turner Educational Advising, suggests that not all prelaw programs are equivalent. Aspiring lawyers should steer clear of vocationally oriented and technically focused prelaw majors that are designed to train paralegals.

If someone does opt for a prelaw degree, it should be a traditional liberal arts degree that will cultivate the intellectual habits necessary for legal practice, says Turco, who managed a prelaw and professional development program at Georgetown University in the District of Columbia for more than a decade.

Admissions data collected and reported by the Law School Admission Council reveals that in the 2019-2020 academic year, law school hopefuls who majored in prelaw and related fields such as law, political science and legal studies did not receive the highest LSAT scores on average, nor did they have the highest law school acceptance rates among majors.

Kellye Testy, the LSAC’s president and CEO, says she takes a “pretty neutral” view on prelaw majors since her opinion is that aspiring lawyers can benefit from any rigorous undergraduate program that is taught by excellent faculty.

“No matter what somebody’s teaching, you’ll learn more from a great teacher. It doesn’t matter the subject.”

Banks Cash In On PPE, But Risks Could Haunt Them

By Al Barbarino
June 19, 2020

U.S. banks are facilitating a flurry of deals to bring personal protective equipment into the country from China and elsewhere in exchange for hefty fees, but inherent risks could come back to bite them as regulators continue to expose underlying fraud.

Presiding over these anything-but-ordinary deals can be a risky business, with “know your customer” due diligence increasingly difficult when sorting through a newfound market that the latest headlines suggest is rampant with fraud, attorneys say.

“Everyone in the world has their hair on fire to get these masks and the rest of the PPE,” said Andrew S. Ittleman, a founding partner of Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph. “With so much more risk of fraud out there … the banks certainly have their work cut out for them.”

The PPE deals often include a web of entities, including brokers in the U.S. calling on relationships in China to access the products. Banks may provide so-called back-to-back letters of credit that guarantee the payments — one bank for the U.S. buyer, and a foreign bank for the seller — which attorneys say could prove problematic down the road.

Ittleman said his work dealing with PPE transactions has made him aware of at least one “very large bank” on the U.S. side executing letters of credit on the deals.

“I would imagine that a bunch of the bigger [banks] are involved too,” he said. “There are going to be all sorts of fees for the letters. … They’re not doing it as a charity. They’re doing it because they have the capabilities and they know how to make money doing it.”

While the attractive fees may be enticing, banks could find themselves in a vulnerable position as they seek to comply with KYC and anti-money laundering rules around customers who may have little to no experience selling PPE.

“They were selling Chinese widgets in the United States yesterday. They were selling plastic flowers or ping pong tables,” Ittleman said. “That requires a lot of trust on behalf of the bank to work with the broker to make sure everything is being conducted the way it should be.”

Regulators have begun to expose fraud in this newfound booming market for PPE. This month, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a Chinese manufacturer with producing and exporting nearly half a million misbranded and defective masks to the U.S. And 3M has now filed at least a dozen lawsuits accusing companies of everything from price-gouging legitimate 3M products to selling counterfeit masks.

Last week, New York State Attorney General Letitia James brought a suit against a Buffalo-area businessman for “soliciting the state of New York” and hospitals across the country with “fake offers of critically needed PPE.” And in late May, a New Jersey used car salesman was arrested and charged in federal court with running a $45 million scheme to sell price-gouged N95 face masks to New York City.

While no banks were indicated in the cases, actions — most likely from the DOJ’s civil division — could start trickling down in the coming weeks or months as more fraud is exposed and the role of banks in any potential transactions is uncovered, attorneys say.

While these types of investigations typically begin with the alleged fraudsters, investigators will ultimately explore all facets of the transactions, said William Barry, a member of Miller & Chevalier who assists clients with a range of financial compliance and regulatory issues.

This will include whether the bank was knowingly involved in its customer’s scheme, if it was “willfully ignorant” of wrongdoing, and if it took the necessary KYC and AML precautions.

“Step one will be to look at the actual suspected fraudster,” Barry said. “Step two is to get the bank’s help in understanding the transaction record. Step three, they’ll consider whether the bank’s processes were deficient or worse than deficient in connection with the fraudulent conduct.”

“The primary risk area is letters of credit and any looseness in those relationships,” he added. “Of course, any bank is interested in having that customer relationship and the fees that it generates, but may not do sufficient diligence to understand who the beneficiary of the letter of credit is or who the client is.”

Community to mid-sized banks are at risk, as many of them lack the safety net of “sophisticated electronic risk monitoring systems” that are commonplace at larger banks, Barry said. But he added that larger banks could face still issues, as their automated processes could fail to identify the PPE transactions as materially significant.

Instances of criminal activity, such as a bank employee being involved directly in a fraudulent scheme, would fall into an entirely separate, and rarer, bucket, experts say.

Clifford Stanford, a partner with Alston & Bird LLP’s bank regulatory team and former assistant general counsel at the Federal Reserve, echoed that most potential penalties will come down to whether KYC and AML standards have been met, with more aggressive action taken if systemic issues are found.

“If it’s systemic … that’s when you start to see banking regulators and the DOJ coming after banks,” he said. “If a bank has failed in performing that KYC and AML discipline and has allowed transactions to move through without appropriate monitoring or reporting, they could also be swept up in a broader review.”

Despite the growing instances of PPE fraud coming to light, attorneys noted the bad apples aren’t representative of the broader lot of legitimate brokers who are simply businesspeople looking to make deals.

Rachel Wolkinson, a partner in Brown Rudnick LLP’s white collar defense and government investigations group, said she’s worked with a number of well-intentioned brokers seeking legal assistance as they look to nail down prospective PPE transactions.

“I don’t know why the bank wouldn’t want to deal with them,” she said, noting many brokers are sophisticated, informed and well-intentioned. “I think it really is going to be very specific to the individual broker. Not every broker is a shady cat looking to exploit the COVID pandemic. Just because you are entrepreneurial, that doesn’t make you a criminal.”

–Additional reporting by Rachel O’Brien and Bill Donahue. Editing by Philip Shea and Marygrace Murphy.

Mitigating Losses:

By Andrew S. Ittleman
May 26, 2020

The following article was written by Andrew Ittleman for the June 2020 edition of MedEsthetics Magazine. We repost the article here with MedEsthetics Magazine’s permission.

The coronavirus pandemic has disrupted virtually every American industry. In many instances, state and local shutdown orders have required businesses to close, and even “essential” businesses have encountered difficulties based on workplace safety concerns, failures in supply chains, and reductions in demand resulting from changed customer behaviors and spending habits.

The coronavirus pandemic has hit the medical aesthetics industry with laser-like precision. Even in the absence of shutdown orders in local jurisdictions, many states have prohibited elective medical procedures altogether, and social distancing requirements have made the unique, in-person interactions between practitioners and their clients difficult, if not outright unlawful. Moreover, unlike other areas of the healthcare space where physicians could recoup some of their lost revenue through telemedicine consultations, cosmetic surgeons and medspas have not been as fortunate. There is simply no replacement for the one-on-one meeting between practitioner and patient in this particular industry.

Ultimately, business owners have been left struggling with questions about how to mitigate past losses and return to work. This article provides an overview of some of the legal issues the medical aesthetics industry may encounter as it enters an unknown future.

Insurance Clauses

Without question, insurance will be the focal point of the legal world for the foreseeable future, keeping in mind the decades of litigation that followed 9/11 (was it one event or two?) and Hurricane Katrina (was it wind damage or flood?). In fact, numerous lawsuits have already been filed against insurers in the U.S. following denials of claims for pandemic-related losses, and this litigation will last for years.

To understand the extent to which your business may be covered for losses related to the coronavirus, the obvious starting point is your policy. As you review it, you will encounter clauses potentially

applicable to the coronavirus, but in most instances they will be vague, subject to further interpretation and provide different coverage based on particular circumstances. For instance, your policy might provide business interruption coverage if your building falls down, but only a deep cleaning if one of your employees is tested positive for Covid-19, unless an exclusion applies. As you review your policy, be on the lookout for the following types of coverage:

Pandemic coverage: Explicit pandemic coverage is rare, and in most instances is something that the insured entity specifically bargained for when purchasing insurance. For instance, Wimbledon, the British Open and many live events in the U.S. purchased and paid for pandemic insurance for years. As a result much of their losses for cancellations in 2020 will be covered. For the rest of us, we will need to look elsewhere in our policies for protection, as “bacteria, mold and viral” exclusions will likely preclude coverage.

Business interruption coverage: Business interruption insurance coverage is intended to protect companies against the loss of income from unexpected events that cause direct physical loss or damage. However, policies often do not define what constitutes a “direct physical loss” necessary to trigger coverage, leaving the judicial system to figure it out. Indeed, there are numerous published court cases studying these clauses based on E. coli, asbestos or other contaminations and odors, but rulings typically turn on state laws and the specific language of the policy. In other instances, pandemics may be explicitly excluded based on changes in the insurance industry dating back to the SARS pandemic, in which case policyholders will face severe difficulties in pursuing their claims in the absence of other technical details in their policies.

Civil authority coverage: Many policies include “civil authority” coverage as a matter of course, which is designed to apply to the actual loss of business income sustained by the insured when access to the insured’s premises is prohibited by order of a civil authority, such as a local or state government. However, in most instances, the civil authority must completely block access to the business premises for the coverage to apply, creating a question regarding how, exactly, the civil authority impacted the policyholder’s business. For instance, whether the civil authority limited business operations or completely closed business premises will be an important question of fact. Likewise—and critical for the medical aesthetics industry—whether the civil authority prohibited elective medical procedures will be another important consideration. Moreover, you will need to determine whether there are exclusions in the policy that preclude coverage if the civil authority loss arises from a noncovered pandemic clause. It should be noted that insurers are already denying claims submitted by healthcare practitioners arising from prohibitions of elective procedures, with several already the subject of federal class action lawsuits.

Contract Clauses

In addition to insurance, practitioners must also be mindful of their contracts with third parties, including suppliers, banks, landlords, key personnel, and other vendors and contractors. These agreements likely assume that business will always be “business as usual,” without an intervening pandemic, shutdown orders and the collapse of the global economy. Whether the parties to these agreements are nevertheless required to perform will again require an interpretation of the agreements themselves and applicable state law. When reviewing your agreements, be mindful of the following clauses and legal concepts:

Force majeureForce majeure clauses relieve parties from their obligations to perform under a contract when an unforeseen event beyond the parties’ control prevents or delays performance. However, not all force majeure clauses are drafted alike. Some may include an exclusive list of events triggering the application of the clause, some may include a nonexclusive list with broad catchall language and still others may simply define the term without supplying examples. Thus, whether your or your counterparty’s obligations to perform under an agreement will be excused will likely be based on the terms of the force majeure clause, keeping in mind that courts typically construe them narrowly.

Impossibility of performance and frustration of purpose: Even in the absence of a force majeure clause, a party’s performance under a contract may be excused if it was impossible or its purpose was frustrated by overriding events. Generally, the legal doctrine of “impossibility of performance” will apply if the party’s performance has been rendered impossible, and not merely more difficult or inconvenient. Alternatively, the doctrine of “frustration of purpose” applies when the purpose of the agreement, i.e., the reason why the parties entered the agreement in the first place, was substantially frustrated by factors beyond the parties’ control, the nonoccurrence of which was assumed by the parties when they entered the agreement. For instance, if a medspa has a contract to purchase a certain amount of product on a monthly basis from a supplier or an agreement to pay a contractor a monthly fee for services rendered, and both agreements assume that the medspa would be a going concern throughout the duration of the agreements, the medspa’s performance under the agreement may ultimately be excused.

Future Liability

After weeks of government-enforced shutdowns, businesses are reopening and medical practitioners are once again providing elective procedures. However, without Covid-19 vaccines, there are widespread concerns of additional future outbreaks, meaning that it is assumed that people will continue to contract the disease when going about their daily routines. Thus, the question remains, how can your practice or medspa avoid future liability if your patients or employees fall ill with the coronavirus? There is no one-size-fits-all answer, but there are important best practices you can employ to avoid liability down the road.

First things first: can your clinic be held liable if a patient contracts the coronavirus as a result of an elective medical procedure? Setting aside the very real hurdle the patient will face in proving that the elective procedure was the cause of the patient’s illness, it is critical to remember that malpractice and negligence are typically defined by state law as the failure to use “reasonable” care, with the definition of reasonableness driven by what is acceptable and appropriate by similar and reasonably careful professionals. Thus, while you may never be able to completely insulate your clinic from the coronavirus, you can take reasoned, measured and concrete steps to protect yourself and your business from allegations of wrongdoing should that worst case scenario arise.

Perhaps the most effective step you can take is the implementation of a workplace surveillance program. As your business reopens, understand that you and all of your employees and patients present a risk of infection and disease spread. In response, many companies are working with occupational health professionals to develop policies and procedures designed to keep workplaces clean and safe. These programs often include weekly testing for employees, routine temperature checks, cleaning controls, required informational submissions and written policies dictating how employees should conduct themselves if they feel ill or have spent time with someone who recently became sick.

Medical practitioners are also asking additional questions of their patients, including whether they or the people they live with are experiencing symptoms, and whether they work in or have recently visited a high-risk environment, such as a hospital. OSHA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and many local authorities have also published recommendations for companies returning to work amid the pandemic, all of which should be reviewed before providing elective procedures.

Civil authorities are important, as their edicts will relate to definitions of “reasonable care” in your local community. As an initial matter, pay attention to them, and review the orders and other bulletins routinely posted on their websites, as they often detail whether and how particular businesses can operate during local health emergencies.

If you provide an elective procedure in a jurisdiction still prohibiting them, you could face fines and penalties, future negligence liability and reputational damage. You may also be consuming medical resources (such as personal protective equipment) sorely needed by local triage units. Moreover, if the elective treatment you provide could require the need for emergency care, the patient’s risk of contracting the coronavirus could be heightened, warranting additional disclosures in informed consents. Finally, whether your insurance policies will protect you if a patient is injured by an elective procedure received during the coronavirus pandemic may also depend on the mandates of civil authorities.

In sum, there are many questions, but perhaps only two certainties. First, there are reasonable steps your practice or medspa can take now to protect your employees and patients from the coronavirus and your business from downstream liability. Second, there is no sign that things will be back to normal for the foreseeable future. Hopefully, you can get back to work without relying on the judicial system, as the courts themselves are not yet fully operational, and in many places were overwhelmed with caseloads even before this pandemic began. Should you have a business dispute resulting from the pandemic, courteous negotiations are always the best measure, as most companies have little appetite for fighting right now. But if litigation is unavoidable, understand that neither the law nor the process is perfect, and it may take years for your case to reach a conclusion, and pursuing it could divert resources away from your reopening efforts. However you proceed, trust that making prudent decisions now will help you carve the path ahead.

How to safeguard your patients and staff:

About this webinar

Wednesday, May 27, 2020 at 02:00 PM (ET)

As physicians continue to navigate the COVID-19 landscape and beyond, our “new normal” requires new practice workflows, higher demands for personal protective equipment (PPE), and increased testing of both patients and staff. With many new testing kits and medical devices on the rise, we’ll call on two experts — one in med-legal, and one in data-driven product distribution and consolidation — to weigh in.

Register Here

Agenda: 

  • What is an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)?
  • What products have EUAs?
  • Testing 101: What are your options, what to look for, and current FDA guidance
  • FDA’s current regulation of PPE
  • Getting back to work

This is the final webinar of a three-part series, sponsored by Doctor.com, AAOM, IOF, and Regenexx on topics that are front of mind for the community.

Hosted By

  • Jo-An Tremblay – Principal & Founder, Plymouth Medical LLC
  • Andrew Ittleman, Esq. – Founder & Partner, Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph
  • Jessica Nikci – General Manager, Emerging Markets, Doctor.com

Home Office Deductions in the Time of Coronavirus

Making Sense of a Commonly Misunderstood Tax Deduction, with Policy Recommendations for Lawmakers and the IRS to Provide Additional Relief for American Taxpayer

Working from home has become the new normal for millions of Americans, and is likely to remain a fundamental aspect of American life even after the COVID-19 crisis begins to fade.  In turn, American workers have been required to adapt their circumstances to the unique demands of working from home—setting up home offices, bearing the expense of increased utility bills, and devoting portions of their homes previously used for personal purposes to business use.

In the face of these new circumstances, many workers may wonder whether the costs associated with setting up and operating a home office are tax deductible.  As is common for questions answered by federal tax law, the answers are less than clear and depend on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances.

Home Office Deduction: Background

As a general proposition, ordinary and necessary business expenses are deductible under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 162.  Further, expenses incurred in the production of income are generally deductible under IRC § 212, and business-related expenses, such as depreciation, are deductible under different parts of the Internal Revenue Code.  Conversely, expenses incurred in maintaining a personal residence, such as utility bills, general maintenance, and depreciation, are generally not deductible.  However, when a taxpayer works from home, the line between business expenses and personal expense—that is, those expenses which are generally deductible and those which are not—becomes blurred.

In balancing these competing considerations, Congress has created a fairly complex set of rules which start with the presumption that expenses relating to the use of a “dwelling unit,” referred to herein as home office expenses, are not deductible, but which carve out important exceptions designed to prevent abuse while furthering the general policy of permitting deduction of business related expenses.

Before examining the rules governing home office deductions, it is important to note two items of particular relevance.  First, the recently enacted CARES Act, known primarily for providing relief measures to individuals and businesses suffering from the COVID-19 crisis, does not directly affect the rules governing home office deductions. Thus, the pre-crisis rules still govern.

Second, in December 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) became law.  One aspect of the TCJA was to eliminate miscellaneous itemized deductions for individual taxpayers for tax years beginning after 2017 and ending before 2026.  Home office deductions under § 280A are miscellaneous itemized deductions for individual taxpayers who work as employees.  Thus, under current law, individual employees are not permitted to claim home office deductions, but home office deductions are still available with respect to taxpayers who file a Schedule C with their 1040 to report the income and expenses of a sole-proprietorship.  Similarly, the home office deduction is available to pass-through business entities, such as partnerships and subchapter S corporations. Given the renewed emphasis on at-home work (which in many cases is mandated by employers or State or local ordinances), it may be wise for Congress to revisit this limitation, at least for the 2020 and 2021 tax years.  However, to date it has not done so.

IRC § 280A

Initially, in balancing between the general deductibility of business-related expenses and the non-deductibility of personal-use expenses, courts applied a relatively lax standard and allowed a deduction for business use of a home when the expense was “appropriate and helpful” to a taxpayer performing his job duties.  See Newi v. Comm’r, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).  Fearing such a standard could lead to abusive behavior, in 1976 Congress passed IRC § 280A.

Section 280A does not itself authorize any deductions—it merely determines when otherwise deductible expenses (for example, those deductible under IRC § 162) may be deducted when those expenses relate to a taxpayer’s home. As noted, the general rule of § 280A is that home office deductions are not allowed.  IRC § 280A(a). However, the statute contains key exceptions.  Specifically, to qualify for the home office deduction under § 280A, a taxpayer’s home (referred to as a “dwelling unit” in the statute) must, on a regular basis, be used exclusively:

  1. As the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer
  2. As a place of business which is used to meet patients, clients, customers, etc. in the normal course of the trade or business, or
  3. In the case of a separate structure not attached to the taxpayer’s residence, in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business.

Further, even if these requirements are met, there are limitations on the deductibility of a home office expense. First, only an allocable portion of the applicable expense can be deducted.  After all, even if a taxpayer works from home, some portion of the expense is used for personal purposes and thus not deductible in any circumstance.  Second, § 280A places a ceiling on the overall amount of a home office deduction.  The rules relating to these limitations are discussed in more depth below.

We also acknowledge that there are special rules relating to rental homes and day care facilities operated out of a taxpayer’s residence, but given that both of those activities will be severely limited in the near future, we will focus in this article on the three primary exceptions listed above.

As a threshold matter, § 280A only applies to expenses incurred with respect to a dwelling unit which the taxpayer uses for personal purposes for more than 14 days in the given tax year.  A dwelling unit includes a house, apartment, condo, mobile home, or similar structure, including all structures or other property appurtenant to the dwelling unit.  For this purpose, personal use generally includes personal (non-business) use by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s family members, or any other individual unless the dwelling unit is rented to that individual for fair value.  Thus if the taxpayer’s home is used as a residence for personal purposes for 14 days or less during the tax year, the deductibility of any associated expenses are determined without reference to § 280A.

Finally, § 280A does not bar deduction of home-related expenses which are otherwise authorized under the Internal Revenue Code notwithstanding the taxpayer’s use of his home in his trade or business.  For instance, the deductibility of mortgage interest is not affected by § 280A.

Home Office Deduction: Elements of Primary Exceptions to § 280A

Before a taxpayer may deduct home office expenses, the taxpayer must satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions to § 280A. The three primary exceptions listed above contain generally applicable requirements and specifically applicable requirements.

    1. Generally Applicable Requirements

For each of the primary exceptions under § 280A, the taxpayer’s home must be used in furtherance of a trade or business, and the portion of the taxpayer’s residence used for business purposes must be exclusively used, on a regular basis, for such business purposes.

  • To be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).  Note that a taxpayer may engage in multiple trades or businesses at the same time, and the taxpayer’s use of his or her home does not have to occur in connection with the taxpayer’s predominant business activity.
  • For this purpose, regular use means frequent and repetitive use. Occasional or incidental use is not sufficient.
  • With respect to exclusivity, while de minimis personal use of the allocated portion of the home may be allowed, the allocated space should be used exclusively for business purposes. For instance, if a taxpayer works from his or her dining room table but then later uses the dining room table for family dinner, expenses allocable to the dining room are not deductible.  See Sengpiehl v. Comm’r, C. Memo. 1998-23. However, business-use space need not be clearly partitioned or separated from the residential portion of the property in order to give rise to a deduction, see Hewett v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-110, although a clear partition is helpful in proving exclusivity.

As noted earlier, prior to the changes imposed by the TCJA, employees could potentially deduct home office expenses, but only if the home was maintained for the convenience of the employee’s employer.  IRC § 280A(c).  This was a fairly difficult standard to meet.  Home offices which were merely helpful to the employer or employee were insufficient to meet this standard.  Generally, in analyzing this question, courts have looked to whether a home office is required as a condition of employment, is necessary to the proper functioning of the business, or is necessary to allow the employee to perform his duties properly. Given the restrictions placed on businesses determined to be non-essential, it seems likely that many employees working from home due to the COVID-19 would be considered to be doing so at the convenience of their employer, but that issue is not settled.  In the event Congress chooses to relax the limitations imposed by the TCJA and allow employees to claim deductions for home office expenses, this issue would likely be at the forefront of the § 280A issues posed by the COVID-19 crisis.

    1. Specifically Applicable Requirements
      1. § 280A(c)(1)(A)

Under § 280A(c)(1)(A), a home office deduction is available when the taxpayer’s residence is the principal place of business.  In some cases, it is obvious that a taxpayer’s home is his or her principal place of business.  For instance, if a taxpayer’s trade or business is operated entirely out of his or her home, the home will be the taxpayer’s principal place of business.  More difficult questions arise when the taxpayer works inside and outside his or her home.  In that circumstance, a taxpayer’s home can qualify as a principal place of businesses so long as the taxpayer uses his or her home to perform administrative or management functions, and there is no other fixed location where substantial management or administrative activities occur.  Thus, if the taxpayer has a home office from which the trade or business is managed, and there is not another location from which substantial management or administrative functions are performed, he or she will be eligible for a home office deduction even if the taxpayer performs services outside the home.  Administrative or management activities include billing, maintenance of books and records, ordering supplies, setting up appointments, and forwarding orders and writing reports.

Further, even if the taxpayer does not engage in substantial administrative or management activities at his or her home, the taxpayer’s home can be the principal place of business based on analysis which looks at the relative importance of the activities performed there and the amount of time spent there.  Comm’r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168 (1993).  This analysis requires an objective description of the business in question, and thereafter an analysis of where the business’s goods or services are delivered or rendered. If the business requires a specialized or unique setting outside the taxpayer’s home to complete its business goals, then it is unlikely the taxpayer’s home will be viewed as the principal place of business.

      1. § 280A(c)(1)(B)

If a taxpayer meets with clients or customers at the taxpayer’s dwelling, then the taxpayer can qualify for the home office deduction even if the taxpayer’s home is not the principal place of business.  For instance, a doctor who sees patients from a home office could qualify for this exception.  However, to date this provision has been interpreted to require in-person meetings.  Telephone meetings are not sufficient.  There does not appear to be any guidance regarding remote face-to-face meetings (e.g. via Zoom), but in ruling that telephone meetings are not sufficient the Ninth Circuit emphasized the need for clients to actually visit the home office.  Green v. Comm’r, 707 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1983).  However, this issue has not been tested in these very unique circumstances in which face-to-face meetings are often prohibited, so the extent to which this exception to the general rule of § 280A will be available to taxpayers meeting their clients and colleagues from home remains an open question.

      1. § 280A(c)(1)(C)

Another possible basis to deduct home-office related expenses arises when the taxpayer maintains a separate structure not attached to his or her dwelling unit.  In that circumstance, a home office deduction is allowable if the free-standing structure is used exclusively and on a regular basis in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business.  What distinguishes this exception from those discussed above is that the free-standing structure need not be the taxpayer’s principal place of business, nor does the taxpayer need to meet customers or clients in person to qualify of this exception.

Home Office Deductions: Limitations on Deductible Amount

In addition to the qualitative prerequisites to the home office deduction, there are two primary limitations on the amount of home-related expenses that may be claimed under § 280A. First, the expense must be allocable to the portion of the home used for qualifying business purposes.  Second, § 280A caps the amount of the home office deduction at the amount of gross income generated by the applicable trade or business.

    1. Home Office Deduction Allocation

Taxpayers may use any method that is reasonable under the circumstances to allocate home-office related expenses between business and personal use.  For instance, if the rooms in the taxpayer’s house are approximately equivalent in size, the allocation can be based on the number of rooms that qualify for the deduction under § 280A.  Alternatively, the allocation can be based on the square footage of the home.  The Tax Court has held that only functional space of the home needs to be included in the denominator of the relevant fraction; in other words, unusable portions of an attic or cellar are not included.  Culp v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-270.

Direct expenses, i.e. those that benefit only the business-use portion of the home, may be deducted in full.  Conversely, indirect expenses benefit both the business-use and personal-use portions of the home (i.e. utility bills, real estate taxes, insurance, etc.).  Indirect expenses may be deducted to the extent of the percentage of the home allocable to qualifying business use.  For instance, if a taxpayer’s electricity bill amounts to $1,000 per year, and 10 percent of his home is allocable to qualifying business use, $100 is the allowable deduction under § 280A.  Unrelated expenses are those which do not benefit any part of the home used for qualifying business purposes.  For instance, if a taxpayer’s home requires kitchen repairs and the kitchen is not used in the taxpayer’s trade or business, those repair expenses are unrelated expenses. Unrelated expenses may not be deducted.

Alternatively, a safe harbor allocation method is available.  Under the safe harbor method, the allocable square footage of the home (not to exceed 300 square feet) is multiplied by a pre-set rate (currently $5). So, for instance, if 150 square feet of the home is used for qualifying business purposes, the safe-harbor deduction would be $750.

    1. Limitations on Amount of Deduction

 Even if a home-office deduction is permitted by IRC § 280A, the deduction is capped by the amount of gross income generated by the business for which the home office is used.  A home office deduction therefore cannot create a net operating loss.  Deduction of expenses relating to a qualifying home office requires several steps, which must be taken in order:

  • First, home-related expenses, the deductibility of which is not determined by the existence of a trade or business (i.e. mortgage interest on the taxpayer’s principal residence, property taxes, etc.), must be allocated between business and non-business uses of the home. The amount of such items allocable to the taxpayer’s home office is deducted against the gross income of the qualifying business and reduces the overall gross income limitation.  The balance is deductible in the ordinary course, without regard to § 280A.  Thus, if a taxpayer paid mortgage interest of $5,000, and 10 percent of the taxpayer’s house is used for business purposes which allow for a deduction under § 280A, $500 (that is, 10 percent of $5,000) is deducted against the gross income of the qualifying business, and the applicable gross income limitation must be reduced by $500.  The balance of the mortgage interest amount for that tax year, $4,500 may be deductible irrespective of § 280A.
  • Second, expenses attributable to the taxpayer’s business activity but not attributable to the use of the taxpayer’s home are deducted against the business’s gross income, and thereby reduce the overall gross income amount against which home office expenses may be deducted. For instance, if the business spends $1,000 on office supplies during the year, such amounts are deductible business expenses generally but they are not attributable to use of the taxpayer’s home (they would have been purchased regardless of the existence of a home office) and therefore reduce the overall gross income limitation by $1,000.
  • Next, expenses that would be have been deductible (for instance under § 162) had the activity giving rise to the expense not been conducted in the taxpayer’s home, but which do not require a basis adjustment (i.e. utilities, insurance, maintenance, etc. that relate to the taxpayer’s residence) may be deducted to the extent of the applicable gross income cap (gross income attributable to the home office business, reduced under steps one and two above).
  • Finally, expenses that would be have been deductible had the activity giving rise to the expense not been conducted in the taxpayer’s home, but do require a basis adjustment (i.e. depreciation of the taxpayer’s residence) may be deducted to the extent of the gross income cap remaining after steps one to three, above.
  • Remember that § 280A does not itself authorize any deductions—it merely determines when otherwise deductible expenses may be deducted when those expenses relate to a taxpayer’s home. 

Home Office Deduction: Illustrative Example 

Because of the various layers to the home office deduction, we will now use an illustrative example to help shed light on how the home office deduction might play out in the real world.

Suppose Taxpayer operates a consulting business from a home office. Taxpayer previously operated from rented space in an office building, but due to the COVID-19 crisis, by local ordinance his office is closed and he has been forced to work from home since April 1. Today, Taxpayer’s billing, record maintenance, and preparation of policies and related contracts—which were previously performed at his business office—are now performed from his home office. However, due to the COVID-19 crisis, Taxpayer does not meet with clients in his home office. Instead, all client meetings are attended remotely.

Taxpayer reports his income and expenses from his consulting business on a Schedule C attached to his Form 1040 each year.

Taxpayer’s home consists of 10 rooms of various sizes, and totals 3,000 square feet.  Taxpayer’s home office occupies an entire room and comprises 300 square feet.  Since the start of the COVID-19 crisis, Taxpayer’s home office is not used for any purposes other than Taxpayer’s consulting business.  Previously it was used as personal storage space, but since the start of the year it had been empty until the Taxpayer began using it for his home office.

Due to concerns regarding the virus, and factors relating to convenience, the Taxpayer continues to work from his home office the rest of the year.  At the conclusion of the year, gross income from the Taxpayer’s consulting business totals $10,000. Taxpayer also incurred the following home-related expenses during the year:

  1. Mortgage interest: $3,000
  2. Real estate taxes: $5,000
  3. Utilities: $1,000
  4. General business supplies: $1,000
  5. Homeowner’s insurance: $1,000
  6. Lawn care: $500
  7. Third-party answering service: $2,000

It is clear that the Taxpayer’s consulting business constitutes a trade or business. Further, his home office should qualify under the generally applicable conditions of §280A. Using a home office during business hours for 9 months of the year—that is, from April to December, should qualify as regular use.  Further, based on these facts, the use will also likely be viewed as exclusive. While his home office space was not used for business purposes from January through March of the tax year, it was not specifically used for any personal purposes either—rather, it was empty.  Had Taxpayer continued to use the space for personal storage purposes, it would be much more difficult to establish entitlement to a home office deduction because the business use of the room would not have been exclusive at all times during the tax year.  See Prop. Reg. § 1.280A-2(g)(1).

The next step is to determine whether the Taxpayer’s business satisfies one of the three primary exceptions provided by § 280A.  Under these facts, the only exception that could apply is the principal place of business exception—Taxpayer does not meet with clients in his home office, and there is no clear authority to date that says remote meetings are sufficient for client-meeting exception.  Moreover, Taxpayer’s office is a room in his house and is not a free-standing structure.  However, since he began utilizing his home office, all administrative and management activities have occurred there, and there is no other fixed location where substantial administrative or management functions occur.  Consequently, the home office should qualify as the Taxpayer’s principal place of business—but only for three-quarters of the year. IRS Pub. 587 (2019) at p. 5 expressly states that partial year use of a residence for a qualifying purpose is sufficient to claim a pro-rata home office deduction.

Taxpayer also properly determines that 10 percent of his home is allocated to an excepted business used under § 280A(c).  Allocating 10 percent of his home to business use is proper because 300 square feet out of a total 3,000 square feet are allocated exclusively for regular use in Taxpayer’s insurance business.

Because the Taxpayer used his home for a qualifying business purposes for only three-quarters of the tax year, the rules of § 280A will only apply to three-quarters of each item.  This example assumes the expense items are evenly allocable to each month during the year (in reality, because expenses often vary month by month, a taxpayer must look to the expenses for each month his home qualifies for the home office deduction).

Of the expenses incurred during the year, mortgage interest and real estate taxes are generally deductible regardless of the business use of the home and thus fall under step 1, outlined above.  However, 10 percent, or $600 (that is 10 percent of $8,000 x 75 percent), still needs to be allocated to the business-use portion of the home. Thus, $600 is deducted from the $10,000 of gross income generated by Taxpayer’s consulting business.  he balance, $7,400, may be deducted by Taxpayer in the normal course, without regard to IRC § 280A.  The overall gross income limitation on home office deductions is reduced by $600 to $9,400.

Next, expenses which are deductible but not related to home use must be taken into account.  Here, that consists of the third party answering service utilized by Taxpayer’s business and the general business supplies.  That $2,250 expense ($3,000 annual total x 75 percent) reduces the overall gross income cap to $7,150.

Next, the home office-related expenses must be allocated between business and non-business use.  Here, those amounts consist of utilities and homeowner’s insurance totaling $2,000.  After application of the allocation percentage, the deductible amount is $200 ($2,000 x 10 percent).  Because Taxpayer’s home was utilized for business purposes during only three-quarters of the year, the deductible amount is reduced by 25 percent, down to $150.  Because the remaining gross income cap ($7,150) exceeds the deductible amount ($150) the full $150 may be deducted against the business’s gross income.

The $500 of lawn care is not allocable to Taxpayer’s business use of his home, and is not otherwise deductible by his consulting business, and is thus not relevant to the analysis.

Policy Considerations

It is clear that § 280A, in its current form, fails to address many of the unique challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis and the attendant changes to American work life.  There are a number of steps Congress can take through legislation, or the IRS can take through the administrative process, even on a temporary basis, to provide relief to struggling American workers.

First, IRC § 67 can be modified so that the home office deduction is available to employees in tax years before 2026. As explained earlier, under current law the home office deduction is not available to individual employees due to the elimination of itemized deductions in the 2018 to 2025 tax years imposed by the TCJA.  However, more than ever employees are working from their home offices and incurring increased expenses as a result. A temporary change to the deductibility of home office expenses (i.e. by expressly excluding qualifying home office expenses from the definition of “miscellaneous itemized deductions” under IRC § 67(b)) could generate larger refunds for millions of taxpayers and serve as an indirect economic stimulus.

Such a change could be supplemented with IRS guidance that making clear that employees who are required to work at home by their employers or pursuant to a federal, state, or local mandate precipitated by the COVID-19 crisis will be considered to be working at home at the convenience of their employers under § 280A(c)(1).  Thus, taxpayers could be confident in claiming these deductions without the need to wait out the slow process through which tax statutes are interpreted by court decisions.  These changes need not be permanent, and could be effective and provide relief even if implemented solely for the 2020 and 2021 tax years.

Moreover, the IRS could issue guidance clarifying that to the extent taxpayers typically met with clients or customers in a home office prior to the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 crisis, continuing those meetings remotely (i.e. face to face, even if not physically in the same room) will not bar taxpayers from claiming a home office deduction under IRC § 280A(c)(1)(B), notwithstanding prior precedent that a taxpayer must meet with clients face to face in order to take advantage of the exception provided by § 280A(c)(1)(B).

FIDJ’s tax and tax litigation attorneys have extensive experience handling a wide variety of taxation matters for clients, both in and out of court.  They will continue to monitor developments in this area of the law, and remain vigilant throuthout the Coronavirus public health emergency. If you have any questions, an attorney can be reached by emailing us at contact@fidjlaw.com or by calling 305.350.5690.

 

 

 

Florida Litigation Update:

In an en banc[1] opinion deciding the matter of Hock v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 2D16-4008, 2020 WL 1036482 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 4, 2020), Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal held that a corporation that becomes administratively dissolved for failure to file an annual report may defend or prosecute an action in order to wind up its business and affairs. This opinion recedes from prior Second DCA precedent (Trans Health Mgmt. Inc. v. Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), which held that a similarly dissolved company could not maintain a lawsuit under Florida law.

The Hock decision concerned the interpretation of two statutes of the Florida Business Corporation Act (“The Act”):

  • 607.1405(1), Florida Statutes (2016), which, provides that a dissolved corporation “may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs;” and
  • 607.1622(8), which stated[2]: “[a]ny corporation failing to file an annual report which complies with the requirements of this section shall not be permitted to maintain or defend any action in any court of this state until such report is filed and all fees and taxes due under this act are paid and shall be subject to dissolution or cancellation of its certificate of authority to do business as provided in this act.”

 

In construing these statutes, the Court organized a timeline which clarified that there is a period between a corporation failing to file an annual report by May 1, and becoming administratively dissolved during which §607.1622(8) applies. In this period, although the corporation may continue business, it cannot engage in litigation. However, once the company is administratively dissolved, § 607.1622(8) is no longer applicable. Instead, § 607.1405 controls and provides that a corporation cannot engage in business “except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs.” However, § 607.1405 has been interpreted to allow a corporation to conduct litigation as part of the winding up process.

The Court rooted its decision in PBF of Fort Myers, Inc. v. D & K Partnership, 890 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), a case decided prior to Trans. Health Mgmt., Inc., which held that § 607.1622(8) pertained only to existing corporations which have failed to file annual reports, not corporations which had been dissolved. The Court explained that § 607.1622(8) provides for two separate consequences if a corporation fails to file its annual report: i) the corporation “shall not be permitted to maintain or defend any action in any court of this state;” and ii) the corporation “shall be subject to dissolution or cancellation of its certificate of authority to do business as provided in [the] act.” The Court reasoned that because an already dissolved corporation cannot be “subject to dissolution”, § 607.1622(8) must be interpreted to apply to the period of time between the May 1 failure to file and the third week in September failure-to-cure cutoff date to prevent administrative dissolution.

Of potential future salience, this decision was not unanimous. Judges Villanti and Atkinson dissented separately arguing that the majority ignored statutory distinctions between corporate dissolution in general and only the specific dissolution brought about administratively. Judge Villanti reasoned the decision undermines the legislative intent of creating incentive for compliance as follows:

[i]f the privilege of doing business in Florida and using the Florida court system to enforce business agreements is the carrot envisioned by the Florida Legislature, then section 607.1622(8) is the proverbial stick enacted to ensure compliance with the statutory annual reporting—and more importantly, fee payment—requirement. Hence, corporations that elect to neither properly dissolve using the statutory procedures nor file their annual report and pay the required taxes are barred from using the court system to further corporate business.

This decision brings the Second DCA into conformity with the Fourth and Fifth Districts. The Fourth District employed similar logic to the majority here in an en banc decision in Nat’l Judgment Recovery Agency, Inc. v. Harris, 826 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which also featured a dissent mirroring Judge Villanti’s thoughts. The Fifth District had previously arrived at the majority’s conclusion through a short one page opinion on a Motion to Dismiss in Cygnet Homes, Inc. v. Kaleny Ltd. of Florida, Inc., 681 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Given the strong dissents from the Second and Fourth Districts, and the fact that not all Districts have opined on the matter, it is doubtful the Florida Courts have heard the last of this issue and it may someday be headed for a final determination in the Florida Supreme Court.

If your business faces similar uncertainty, the attorneys at Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph have extensive experience interpreting corporate statutes and regulations and fighting for business owners across the state of Florida.  If you have any questions or concerns, an attorney can be reached by emailing us at info@fidjlaw.com or by calling (305) 350-5690.

 

 

[1] En banc means that the matter was heard before all of the judges on this circuit rather than a selected panel as usual. The fact that the Court addressed this matter in this fashion indicates that it was necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions and/or that the proceedings involved a question the Court deemed to be of exceptional importance.

[2] § 607.1622(6), Fla. Stat.  has since been updated to read: “[a] domestic corporation or foreign corporation that fails to file an annual report that complies with the requirements of this section may not prosecute or maintain any action in any court of this state until the report is filed and all fees and penalties due under this chapter are paid, and shall be subject to dissolution or cancellation of its certificate of authority to transact business as provided in this chapter” (emphasis added). The primary change to the statute being that the mandatory “shall not” has been altered to the more permissive “may not.”

 

Coronavirus Tax Relief:

In light of the widespread disruption to American life caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the IRS has promulgated a broad set of deadline extensions, which afford taxpayers substantial relief.  Additionally, under new IRS guidance, the government itself has additional time to take certain actions which may have lasting impacts on taxpayers currently involved in controversy matters with the IRS.  These extensions of time, summarized below, are set forth in IRS Notice 2020-23, which was released on April 9, 2020.

IRS Notice 2020-23 provides relief to taxpayers who face deadlines which would otherwise arise between April 1, 2020 and July 15, 2020.  Specifically, any taxpayer who must file or make payments with respect to certain forms between April 1 and July 15 is granted an automatic extension of time to July 15 to complete the filing or make the payment.  Among the primary forms Notice 2020-23 applies to (a full list is provided in the Notice) are:

  • IRS Form 1040 (annual return of individual taxpayers)
  • IRS Form 1120, 1120-F, and 1120-S (annual returns of subchapter C, subchapter S, and foreign corporations)
  • IRS Form 1065 (annual return of partnerships)
  • IRS Form 1041 (annual return of estates and trusts)
  • IRS Form 706 (estate and generation-skipping transfer return)
  • IRS Form 709 (gift and generation-skipping transfer return)
  • IRS Form 990-T or 990-PF (returns of exempt organizations, including those classified as private foundations)
  • IRS Form 1040-ES (return related to quarterly estimated tax payments)

Thus if a return was originally due April 15, the deadline has automatically been extended to July 15.  This extension applies to all schedules and attachments that typically must be filed with these forms as well, in addition to any elections that must typically be made on such forms.

In addition to providing relief with respect to form filing and payment deadlines, deadlines to file petitions with the Tax Court, a notice of appeal of a Tax Court decision, filing a claim for refund of tax, or filing a lawsuit seeking a refund of tax that would otherwise fall within April 1, 2020 and July 15, 2020 are also automatically extended to July 15.  For instance, if a taxpayer received an IRS notice of determination dated March 1, typically the Taxpayer would have 90 days—that is, until May 29, 2020—to file a petition to the Tax Court.  Under the Notice, that deadline is extended until July 15, 2020.

Additionally, all of this relief is automatic, meaning that neither the taxpayer nor his tax lawyer or accountant needs to file anything with the IRS to receive this relief. Additionally, the regular extension periods available to taxpayer are still available.  However, if a taxpayer seeks a regularly available extension, the relief provided by Notice 2020-23 does not serve to add additional time to the regularly extended deadline.  For instance, if a calendar year taxpayer files an extension application with respect to his or her 2019 1040 (which would extend the 1040 deadline from April 15, 2020 to October 15, 2020 in normal circumstances), no additional time is provided by reason of Notice 2020-23; the deadline to file the return would still be October 15, 2020.

In addition to providing taxpayers relief, Notice 2020-23 also provides additional time for the government (chiefly the IRS) to take certain actions. Specifically, with respect to any taxpayer (individual or entity) who is under IRS examination or whose case is before the IRS Office of Appeals, the Notice provides the government an additional 30 days to:

  • Assess any tax;
  • Give or make any notice or demand for the payment of any tax, or with respect to any liability to the United States in respect of any tax;
  • Collect, by levy or otherwise, the amount of any liability in respect of any tax;
  • Bring suit, by the United States, or any officer on its behalf, in respect of any liability in respect of any tax;
  • Allow a credit or refund of any tax; and
  • Take any other act specified in a revenue ruling, revenue procedure, notice, or other guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin

The relief provided by IRS Notice 2020-23 is substantial and represents an acknowledgement by the IRS of the seriousness of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.  As evidence of this acknowledgement, in normal circumstances extensions to file a return do not concomitantly provide an extension to pay the tax due; even if the deadline to file a return is extended, interest and penalties will accrue unless payment is made by the return’s original due date.  That is not the case under the Notice. Rather, the Notice essentially acts as a waiver by the IRS of three months of penalties and interest associated with an outstanding tax liability.

In addition to extending return filing deadlines, the Notice also carries the potential to substantially affect litigation of federal tax issues.  The Notice provides additional time to make decisions regarding whether to file a petition in Tax Court, whether to appeal a Tax Court decision, or whether to file a refund suit.  Conversely, the Notice also provides the IRS additional time to assess tax and make collection, in addition to other steps.  Consequently, Notice 2020-23 may substantially affect common taxpayer defenses, such as expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.

FIDJ serves as tax counsel for individuals, as well as a wide range of for profit and tax exempt entities. If you or your company are in need of tax counsel related to the Coronavirus or any other issues, feel free to contact us for a free initial consultation.

Florida Second DCA Challenges Status Quo On Delegation of Arbitrability

By:  Allan A. Joseph, Esq.

On March 25, 2020, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal issued its panel decision in Doe v. Natt, 2D19-1383, 2020 WL 1486926 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 25, 2020). A copy of the decision is available here.

The facts of the case are as astonishing as its holding.

A Texas couple sued Airbnb in Florida state court after learning that they had been videotaped by a voyeuristic host who had installed hidden cameras in his Longboat Key vacation condominium.

Airbnb moved to compel arbitration.

The arbitration agreement provided for arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association and that the Federal Arbitration Act would govern its interpretation.

The trial court ruled that it “the issue of arbitrability had to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court.” Natt, 2020 WL 1486926*2.

The issue before the Second DCA in Natt was whether the mere reference to the AAA Rules was “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the Does intended to delegate the issue to the arbitration panel. See, e.g., Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010) (“An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.”).

The Second DCA held, in a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Matthew Lucas, that merely referencing the AAA Rules is not sufficiently clear evidence that the parties intended to delegate arbitrability and thus the Court remained the presumptive gatekeeper to determine whether the Does’ claims against Airbnb were arbitrable:

[The AAA Rules] were referenced in the click wrap agreement as a generic body of procedural rules, and that reference was limited to how “the arbitration” was supposed to be “administered.” Plainly, the agreement’s reference to the AAA Rules … addresses an arbitration that is actually commenced. In other words, the directive is necessarily conditional on there being an arbitration. If a claim is arbitrated, then the AAA Rules apply. But if the question were put, “Who should decide if this dispute is even subject to arbitration under this contract?” to respond, “The arbitration will be administered by the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes,” is not a very helpful answer and not at all clear.

 Natt, 2020 WL 1486926, at *7.

Natt therefore holds that merely making reference to the AAA rules, even Rule 7(a), is insufficient to “clearly and unmistakably” prove delegation. Natt, 2020 WL 1486926, at *7 (“’[Rule7(a)] merely states that the arbitrator shall have ‘the power’ to determine issues of its own jurisdiction …. This tells the reader almost nothing, since a court also has the power to decide such issues, and nothing in the AAA rules states that the AAA arbitrator, as opposed to the court, shall determine those threshold issues, or has exclusive authority to do so.”’) (citation omitted).

Judge Lucas acknowledges that the decision “may constitute something of an outlier in the jurisprudence of [the FAA].” Natt, 2020 WL 1486926, at *8. In this regard, he is referring, among other prior cases, to Terminix Intern. Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005), and its progeny, which hold that agreeing to arbitrate under the AAA Rules is “sufficiently clear and unmistakable” evidence of delegation.

Collectively, [Terminix; U.S. Nutraceuticals; and Spirit Airlines] dictate that by incorporating AAA rules into an agreement parties clearly and unmistakably evince an intent to delegate questions of arbitrability. …. Th[e] default rule [that ordinarily questions of arbitrability are decided by the Court) was overcome in Terminix, though, because the arbitration agreement at issue there provided that “arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules then in force of the [AAA].” Those rules, in turn, gave the arbitrator “the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” In agreeing to arbitrate according to rules that granted this power to the arbitrator, we reasoned, the parties in Terminix clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator would have this power

JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923, 937 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Judge Lucas also recognizes that the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Younessi v. Recovery Racing, LLC, 88 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), and Reunion W. Dev. Partners, LLLP v. Guimaraes, 221 So. 3d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), respectively, have held that where the language of the arbitration provision indicates that the AAA rules “govern” the proceedings, the parties are deemed to have clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability. Natt thus recognizes express and direct conflict with Younessi and Reunion:  Id. at *10 (“Because we disagree with the conclusion those courts appeared to reach concerning what constitutes sufficient clarity and unmistakability of intent to have an arbitrator, rather than a court, resolve questions of arbitrability, we certify conflict with Reunion and Younessi to the extent they are inconsistent with our decision today.”)

Although the panel decision in Natt is not final and is subject to rehearing, rehearing en banc, and, potentially, conflict review by the Florida Supreme Court, it is worth noting not only for its pro-consumer ruling, but also for providing new guidance on drafting arbitration clauses, namely: drafters should expressly indicate that the parties have agreed to delegate arbitratbility to the arbitrators.

Arbitrability and delegation are complex legal issues under both the Federal Arbitration Act and the Florida Arbitration Code. If you are confronting an issue regarding the interpretation of an arbitration provision in a written contract be sure to seek qualified legal advice. FIDJ’s commercial litigation and corporate attorneys are ready, willing and able to help.